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26
 
 

Archived link

The Central Tibetan Administration [CTA], also known as the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, has announced plans to publish a comprehensive book and map documenting the original Tibetan names of places and boundaries. This initiative, aimed at countering China’s escalating cartographic aggression, was disclosed by CTA President Penpa Tsering during an interview with Hindustan Times.

President Tsering [...] explained the challenges and scope of the project, noting that the complexity would vary depending on the depth of research undertaken. “The work on the map is under process, and much will depend on to what level we need to go to find out the original names in Tibetan. If we restrict it only to townships, the task becomes much easier. Maybe we will begin by focusing on townships and later expand it to include villages, and that involves a lot of work.”

[...]

Prominent international media organisations, including The Guardian, AFP, ANI, and NDTV, have been criticised for using the term “Xizang” in their reports. A recent example involved coverage of the devastating earthquake in Dingri County, Shigatse Prefecture, which claimed 134 lives, injured 337, and destroyed thousands of homes. These reports prominently featured the Chinese term, drawing criticisms from the Tibetan community.

In another instance, the Musée du quai Branly in France faced backlash for using “Xizang” in its catalogue of Tibetan artefacts. Following strong opposition from the Tibetan community, supporters, and activist groups like Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) in France, the museum eventually removed the term. Scholars argued that the use of “Xizang” aligns with China’s official narrative and diminishes Tibet’s cultural and historical autonomy.

[...]

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Archived link

[The CCP doesn't rewrite history, it increasingly tries to prevent it from ever being written.]

How has the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tended the gaping chasm between propaganda and reality in China’s modern history? And what do earlier historical precedents of propaganda around past atrocities bode for future propaganda on East Turkistan [or Xinjiang, as the region is also called]?

[...]

For now, the CCP’s mission to propagandize a fairyland version of East Turkistan continues apace. Along with vast amounts of content in the domestic media and sponsored content abroad, the CCP’s messaging also appears in traveling exhibitions, in “conferences,” in carefully stage-managed media and diplomatic tours of the region, and at travel shows where people are invited to “unveil the truth” about the region.

[...]

A basic metric for the scale of oppression is that Uyghurs (at barely one percent of China’s national population) comprise up to 60 percent of China’s entire prison population. Up to half of all imprisoned journalists in China are Uyghur. Uyghurs are the most likely of all inmates to die in prison. Coercive family planning policies have led to an alarming crash in the number of Uyghur births, worse even than the rates during genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda. There is evidence that forced labor programs in the Uyghur Region are expanding. Expressions of faith and cultural identity have been criminalized. But the Party would have us believe that Uyghurs are “the happiest Muslims in the world.”

[...]

History as propaganda

Party-branded history forms the essence of day-to-day Party propaganda. A famous adage states that journalism is the first rough draft of history. Conversely in China, “journalism”—communications and propaganda—is dictated and proof-read by Party historians and ideologues.

[...]

Standalone Uyghur histories are not tolerated: Uyghurlar by poet and historian Turghun Almas was quickly banned after its release in 2010. In early 2022, Sattur Sawut, a historian who drew on previous official versions of the Uyghur Region’s past was given a suspended death sentence for a history book he compiled, and three of his associates were given life sentences.

The Party-line history insists that the Uyghur Region has been part of “the Motherland” since the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD), and that the Uyghur people—along with all ethnicities in the Uyghur Region—have been “members of the same big family” ever since. In other words, the Uyghur people, their land and their culture are all just scions of a greater Chinese entity. The absurd use of the metaphor of a pomegranate to describe the closeness of all ethnic people in the region is far more descriptive of Uyghurs crammed into prison cells.

And it is the CCP’s mission to wrench the Uyghur people into a state of being that affirms this telling of history as narrated by the propaganda which largely fuels human rights atrocities in the region.

[...]

The Great Chinese Famine [between 1958 and 1962] is widely regarded as the worst man-made disaster in human history. Absurdly ambitious agricultural policies were pursued to ridiculous lengths. Claims of outrageously high crop yields were championed by the Party, which then turned a willfully blind eye to the devastation their policies caused to food production. Even as people starved to death in plain sight the Party’s focus was instead on celebrating its own genius and exacting brutal recrimination against anyone who dared doubt it.

Estimates for the numbers of people who died in the famine vary between 2.6 and 55 million. One of the most rigorous studies—Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962 by former Xinhua journalist Yang Jisheng—estimates 36 million people died while another 40 million “failed to be born” due to falling birthrates.

Yang quotes Lu Baoguo, a Xinhua journalist at the time, who recounts: “In the second half of 1959, I took a long-distance bus from Xinyang to Luoshan and Gushi [in Henan Province]. Out of the window, I saw one corpse after another in the ditches. On the bus, no one dared to mention the dead.”

More than 60 years later, official accounts of the period gloss over the famine as “The Three Years of Hardship” (三年困难时期). At the time of writing, the top result from a Google search of the “gov.cn” domain using the term “The Three Years of Hardship” is a 2015 article from the “Party History Research Office of the CCP Yueyang Municipal Committee” in Hunan, which states: “In 1959, 1960, and 1961, there were three consecutive years of natural disasters coupled with the Soviet Union’s debt collection and leftist ideological interference, and the country entered a difficult period and the people lived in hardship.”2

The famine is “completely absent” from China’s history textbooks; Yang Jisheng hasn’t been permitted to leave China to accept awards for Tombstone, which hasn’t even been published in China.

Continuing to whitewash and doctor the historical record will inevitably form the foundation of the CCP’s future propaganda strategy on East Turkistan. Given the framing of the Great Chinese Famine, the closest the Party may ever come to acknowledging, for example, the astronomical rates of Uyghur imprisonment—up to one in 17 adults—will be a similarly trivializing non-confession: “The Party displayed an abundance of caution in the face of challenging domestic and international pressures, which led in some areas to an over-enthusiasm for intensive education measures.”

[...]

**The Tiananmen Massacre, June 3–4, 1989 **

The CCP Department of Propaganda’s central offices are a short tank-drive from Tiananmen Square itself—merely half a city block—and anyone there would certainly have witnessed the massacre, if they chose to.4

It’s well-known that the Department of Propaganda is adept at flooding online spaces with counter narratives and disinformation. However, the department’s other primary function is brute censorship. Every year around the anniversary of the massacre, huge volumes of material attempting to discuss or memorialize events are liable to be wiped from China’s cyberspace.

Online postings containing any one of hundreds of keywords are considered suspect. Some of the keywords are obvious: “tank man” or even just “tank,” for example. Others are a stark demonstration of the CCP’s nervousness: postings containing “candle” are suspect because some of the bereaved light candles in memory of those killed. Still other keywords are evidence of people’s ingenuity and determination to memorialize the massacre: posts containing the otherwise meaningless characters 占占点 are deleted because the characters are intended as a pictogram of tanks rolling over people.

That the Party was willing to turn the military forces of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army against unarmed Chinese citizens was a shock that still reverberates around the country 35 years on. And whereas the Party’s stance on other events may have softened over the years – some incidents are “reassessed” by Party historians and individuals once vilified are posthumously “rehabilitated” – there has been no significant deviation in the Party’s refusal to countenance any kind of public accounting for the Tiananmen Massacre.

[...]

Conclusion

The CCP employs—and will undoubtedly continue to employ—various tried and tested propaganda strategies in East Turkistan. The lesson from the Great Leap Forward is how to make the record invisible, the Cultural Revolution is a lesson in blaming others, and the Tiananmen Massacre a lesson in outright denial and the utility of the delete key. These same strategies are evident in other atrocities not covered in this article: the decimation of Tibet, the murderous campaign against Falun Gong, or the Party’s mishandling of the Covid outbreak, to name but a few.

The continuation of a people’s culture depends on the validity of their memories and experience. The challenge of maintaining the integrity of Uyghur identity is falling ever harder on the diaspora, notwithstanding the CCP’s concerted efforts to harass and silence Uyghurs abroad. This is a mission that’s well understood in the diaspora and among their supporters, but greater assistance against Beijing’s vast propaganda machine is always welcome.

Propaganda is neither a science nor an art, and for over a century there has been no true innovation in Chinese propaganda. The paradigm shifts of digital media and mass communications haven’t altered the basic impulse: dominate or destroy narratives in support of ulterior motives. As Chairman Mao put it, “Make the past serve the present.” But perhaps Churchill put it more succinctly: “History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it.”

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Archived link

According to Sikyong Penpa Tsering, President of the Tibetan government-in-exile, the sharp decline in Tibetan arrivals is attributed to increased Chinese control following the 2008 uprising. Tsering also pointed to demographic shifts in Tibet, noting that there are fewer children due to reduced family sizes.

Speaking to ANI, President of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Sikyong Penpa Tsering said, "Just like any other community, the Tibetan diaspora community is also facing a lot of social and demographic change. One reason is, of course, from 1959-60 people proceeded or followed His Holiness the Dalai Lama--about 80-85 thousand Tibetans who came to India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Then till about the early 80s, there was no movement from Tibet at all, and from the early 80s onwards, some Tibetans were coming out during Hua Guofeng's time, and then from the 90s and year 2000, there were quite many Tibetans coming out up to 2008. We used to receive any number between 2,500 to 3,500 Tibetans every year. Most of them were young children who were left behind to study in India, not knowing whether they would be able to meet their families again or not."

This drastic decline has resulted in the Tibetan Reception Centre in Khaniyara village near Dharamshala standing largely vacant.

[...]

"After the 2008 uprising in Tibet, there was more control inside Tibet, and there may be other reasons why those things are happening. After Xi Jinping came into power, the control over the whole of China, more particularly over the Tibetan people, has been very strong, and even small variables like tourist guides who have been bringing these people over the Himalayas by taking money--have also been removed from Lhasa, as a lot more pressure on the Nepalese government," said Tsering.

[...]

Tsering highlighted efforts in Western countries to create new compact communities. "The larger number of Tibetans are in North America, Europe, Australia--all these countries. So there have been some initiatives from some Tibetans, particularly in Manasota, where we are talking about at least 3,000 to 5,000 Tibetans. They are planning to acquire about 80 acres of land to accommodate about 300 families where the compact Tibetan communities [can thrive]. Another group is also planning to open a charter school for Tibetans. These are new ecosystems within the Tibetan community," he said.

[...]

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Archived links

Unofficial sources have been stated to suggest that at least 100 people have died in one township as a result of the devastating earthquake that hit Tibet’s Mt Everest county of Dingri in Shigatse City on Jan 7 morning, casting doubts on China’s official claim of a total of 126 known casualties thus far. The doubt is reinforced by China’s total ban on access to the affected region for everyone, including the independent media, except for government dispatched rescue groups.

Suggesting that at least 100 deaths had occurred in the county’s Dramtso township alone, which has ten villages – including Senga (Zingkar, the Township headquarter), Gurong (Guring), and Chajiang – the Tibetan service of rfa.org Jan 10 said, based on Tibetan sources, that it was among the worst affected. China’s official media had mentioned the epicentre Tsogo (with seven villages) and Chulho too among the worst affected townships in Dingri county.

[...]

While determining the exact death toll is currently very challenging, “everybody is sceptical of the official death toll, but we have no way to know the actual figures,” [...] a resident of Tibet’s capital Lhasa [is] saying.

[...]

The available pictures of the disaster, which show rescue personnel actively helping victims, are mostly, if not all, those taken and released by China’s official media. This is because China is reported to prohibit individuals from taking pictures or videos, with police being deployed to monitor aid workers to ensure compliance. Independent media continues to remain banned from Tibet.

[...]

Tibetans from across the region attempting to rush assistance were being blocked at various newly set up checkpoints, with authorities requiring permits for entry. They are said to be required to hand over to Chinese authorities all aid materials for distribution, leaving volunteers unable to directly provide support to those in need. As a result, mountains of relief and aid materials donated for the earthquake victims are stated to be piled up at the government’s local disaster relief management centre in Dingri county.

[...]

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Archived link

A Philippine security official said Tuesday that China is “pushing us to the wall” with growing aggression in the disputed South China Sea and warned that “all options are on the table” for Manila’s response, including new international lawsuits.

A large Chinese coast guard ship patrolled hotly disputed Scarborough Shoal in recent days and then sailed toward the northwestern coast of the Philippines on Tuesday, coming as close as 77 nautical miles (143 kilometers), Philippine officials said in a news conference.

[...]

“You’re pushing us to the wall,” Malaya said of China. “We do not and will not dignify these scare tactics by backing down. We do not waver or cower in the face of intimidation. On the contrary, it strengthens our resolve because we know we are in the right.”

[...]

Two Philippine coast guard ships, backed by a small surveillance aircraft, repeatedly ordered the 165-meter (541-foot) Chinese coast guard ship to withdraw from the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, a 200-nautical mile (370-kilometer) stretch of water, Philippine coast guard Commodore Jay Tarriela said.

“What we’re doing there is, hour-by-hour and day-to-day, (we’re) challenging the illegal presence of the Chinese coast guard for the international community to know that we’re not going to allow China to normalize the illegal deployment,” Tarriela said.

[...]

The Philippines has aggressively defended its territorial interests in the South China Sea, a key global trading route. That has brought Philippine forces into frequent confrontations with China’s coast guard, navy and suspected militia boats and sparked fears that a bigger armed conflict could draw in the United States, the Philippines’ longtime treaty ally and China’s regional rival.

The lopsided conflict has forced the Philippines to seek security arrangements with other Asian and Western countries, including Japan, with which it signed a key agreement last July which would allow their forces to hold joint combat training. The pact, which must be ratified by lawmakers of both countries before it takes effect, was the first such agreement to be forged by Japan in Asia.

[...]

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Chinese spy prosecutions in Taiwan tripled in four years: Taipei found evidence the CCP was seeking snipers in Taiwan to target members of the military and foreign organizations in the event of an invasion

The number of Chinese spies prosecuted in Taiwan has grown threefold over a four-year period, the National Security Bureau (NSB) said in a report released yesterday.

In 2021 and 2022, 16 and 10 spies were prosecuted respectively, but that number grew to 64 last year, it said, adding that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was working with gangs in Taiwan to develop a network of armed spies.

Spies in Taiwan have on behalf of the CCP used a variety of channels and methods to infiltrate all sectors of the country, and recruited Taiwanese to cooperate in developing organizations and obtaining sensitive information from Taiwan’s government, the report said.

[...]

The CCP infiltrates Taiwan through engagement with local gangs, illegal private money lenders, shell companies, religious groups and nonprofit organizations, the report said.

The CCP seeks operatives in Taiwan by building network connections, using financial incentives, coercing people with debt, and infiltrating military, government and civil society organizations, it said, adding that China also tries to interfere with elections in Taiwan.

The NSB said it has found evidence that gangs recruited by the CCP were asked to raise Chinese flags and engage in armed insurrection in the event of an attempted invasion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

The insurrection plans called for trained snipers in Taiwan to attack members of the military and foreign organizations, the report said.

It also called for military personnel to fly helicopters to China to surrender during an invasion and to hand over Taiwan’s defense plans to the CCP ahead of such an invasion, it said.

[...]

Prosecutions and conviction rates of spies have increased, and last year, investigators cracked a spy ring involving 23 people and sentenced one spy to 20 years of imprisonment, the report said.

The detection of espionage has been helped in the past few years by clues provided by military officers and soldiers, and the public, which showed that public awareness of security issues has greatly increased, it added.

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Archived link

The thermometer read over 30 degrees Celsius (around 90 Fahrenheit) in the early hours of December 23, when Brazilian authorities turned up at the construction site of car giant BYD's new factory in Camacari, in the northern state of Bahia.

MPT investigators told DW that they rescued 163 Chinese workers from "slavery-like" working conditions at the site.

In the dormitories of the Jinjiang Group, the company hired by BYD to carry out the work, there were no mattresses on the beds, and the few toilets served hundreds of workers in extremely unhygienic conditions. The workers also had food stored without refrigeration.

The Brazilian Labor Prosecutor's Office (MTP) also accused the companies of withholding the workers' passports and keeping 60% of their wages; the remaining 40% would be paid in Chinese currency.

After authorities claimed that the workers were victims of international human trafficking, the site was shut down. The factory had been due to open in 2025.

[...]

Experts [said] hat the case pits the importance of Chinese investment against upholding local standards.

"This action was all the more significant because it took place in a company that enjoys strong political support, both in the federal government and in Bahia, due to the importance of its investments in Brazil for President Lula's reindustrialization projects," said Mauricio Santoro, a political scientist and professor of international relations at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. China's overseas production in focus

On Tuesday, MPT investigators met with representatives of BYD and the companies involved in the construction.

All of the rescued workers have already received their termination payments and returned to China. A report on the inspection of the site will be completed next week, and compensation for the workers will be discussed at a subsequent meeting.

[...]

Using Chinese workers to build the BYD plant is similar to how Chinese multinationals operate in Africa and other Latin American countries, said Paulo Feldmann, an economist and professor at the FIA Business School in Sao Paulo.

The practice brings little benefit to the countries that receive the investment, he [said].

"For Brazil, it would have been better if these workers had been local, because of the income they would have generated for themselves and their families, the positive impact on their communities and the professional training they would have acquired. It would also be easier to monitor their working conditions," he said.

[...]

In the aftermath of the scandal, BYD and its contractor, Jinjiang Group, have denied the allegations. They called them part of a smear campaign against Chinese brands, a narrative supported by many Chinese nationalists.

[...]

But not everyone in China has accepted the idea of blaming "foreign forces."

Some Weibo users wrote that working conditions at BYD factory in Brazil were similar to those of construction workers in China. This sparked online discussions about how many workers in China could be living in conditions that are slavery-like by international standards.

The Chinese labor market is notorious for its so-called "996" work culture, which involves working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. six days a week, in violation of labor laws. This phenomenon is particularly prevalent in the technology sector.

"I stand with Brazil. Chinese workers are being ruthlessly exploited," one comment stated under a Weibo post paralleling the working conditions at BYD's Brazilian factory with those at local construction sites.

"I feel that domestic factories often don't treat people as humans, but rather as machines," another comment said.

[...]

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Archived link

Over the past two years, a growing number of dramatic attempts to escape the People’s Republic of China have been covered by global news media. Some of the individuals in question successfully managed to find refuge and asylum, while others were – and unfortunately continue to be – sent back to China by Governments friendly or subservient to the CCP [Chineses Communist Party].

Often missing from these stories is the wider picture: each of these individuals – often human rights defenders – is but one in a rapid escalation of individuals desperate to leave China since Xi Jinping came to power.

Data released by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show a clear trend: between 2012 and mid-2024, over one million Chinese have sought asylum abroad.

The number is even more staggering considering the increasing exit controls (including exit bans) placed on determinate categories of Chinese citizens by Chinese authorities. The continuing upward trend also serves as a stark reminder that China’s domestic human rights abuse is not the mere “internal affair” as it so often likes to claim.

Highlights:

[...]

  • The number of asylum seekers in 2024 is up 169% compared with the Pre-Covid period (2019: 104,259)

  • The number of asylum seekers in 2024 is up 1426% compared with the year Xi Jinping rose to power (2012: 12,362)

  • In 2024, the number of Chinese asylum seekers since Xi Jinping took power in 2012 broke the one million mark (2012-2024: 1,158,739).

  • To put things into perspective: in 2022 alone, the number of Chinese asylum-seekers abroad was the same as during the entire 10-year Hu Jintao era.

[...]

Data for 2021: the United States remained by far the most popular choice, with 88,722 persons seeking asylum there. The only other place that has been consistently popular is Australia, with 15,774 Chinese asylum-seekers last year.

Canada, Brazil, South Korea, and the UK also saw thousands of Chinese asylum-seekers.

Europe was far less popular, with Spain taking in 900, compared to Germany’s 379 and France’s 248. Other European countries, as well as most Asian and African countries, received almost no requests in 2021.

[...]

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Archived link

Gao Shanwen, chief economist at state-owned SDIC Securities, had suggested that China’s real economic growth {measured by the Gross Domestic Product, GDP] in recent years may have been closer to 2% annually, not 5% as claimed by authorities. Now, he has been banned from public speaking indefinitely.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has reportedly ordered an investigation into a prominent economist who questioned the credibility of Beijing’s official GDP figures and criticised the government’s economic policies.

Gao Shanwen, chief economist at state-owned SDIC Securities, has been banned from public speaking for an indefinite period, Washington Post reported citing individuals familiar with the matter.

[...]

The move came after Gao’s remarks at a Washington forum last month, where he suggested that China’s real economic growth in recent years may have been closer to 2 per cent annually, well below the 5 per cent claimed by authorities. Gao also expressed scepticism about the government’s ability to effectively implement measures to stimulate growth.

“We do not know the true number of China’s real growth figure,” Gao had said during the December 12 event co-hosted by the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a Chinese think tank. He speculated that the actual growth rate might be significantly lower than official data suggested.

Xi is said to have been angered by Gao’s remarks, ordering that he be disciplined. Although Gao has retained his job, his public engagements have been curtailed. A planned lecture at China’s Nankai University was abruptly cancelled in January, reportedly due to “scheduling conflicts.”

[...]

This crackdown on Gao comes as Beijing seeks to manage growing concerns over its economic trajectory. China’s economy faces mounting challenges, including a real estate crisis that has eroded household wealth by an estimated $18 trillion, rising debt nearing 300 per cent of GDP, and industrial overcapacity. Analysts have raised concerns about the risk of a deflationary spiral.

[...]

Beijing has intensified efforts to suppress negative commentary about the economy, with senior officials urging tighter control over economic messaging. In a recent meeting, Cai Qi, Xi’s chief of staff, called for greater “expectation management” to counteract pessimism.

[...]

More recently, discrepancies between official data and other economic indicators, such as wage growth and exports, have fuelled scepticism among economists.

[...]

Such a slowdown would challenge Xi’s goal of doubling the nation’s economic output by 2035.

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Archiv-Link

China has been cultivating a network of Western influencers across various platforms to shape global narratives on issues critical to its foreign policy. These influencers come from diverse countries and backgrounds and are lured using a complex and often subtle system of incentives that can be difficult to untangle. Jan Michálek, a Czech TikToker with over a million followers, found himself entangled in this network – a situation he may not have foreseen.

China’s Influencer Army

After returning from an all-expenses-paid trip to Beijing, Michálek found himself accused of spreading Chinese propaganda. The influencer community was quick to criticize him, releasing videos and interviews with titles such as “Czech Influencer Sold Himself to China” or “Honzi Michálek – The Best Chinese Propagandist.” While the case of Jan Michálek may stem from naivety, the phenomenon of Western influencers profiting from spreading Chinese misinformation and disinformation is not new.

[...]

In addition to promoting its narratives abroad, Beijing also leverages Western influencers to reinforce domestic messaging. The perspectives of foreigners, often perceived as both more neutral and “exotic,” can attract Chinese audiences, lending credibility to different narratives about both foreign and domestic policy. This approach mirrors Beijing’s strategy of recruiting influencers from ethnic minority communities to depict regions like Xinjiang and Tibet in a light favorable to the regime.

[...]

Red Carpet Treatment

These mechanisms were apparently unknown to Michálek when he was first contacted by a Czechia-based agency (the influencer did not provide its name) two years ago. The agency offered him a collaboration with a Chinese vlogger who had allegedly studied and lived in Czechia, to help him build a following there. The vlogger produced content featuring traditional Chinese recipes, tea-making, and explorations of Chinese nature. Michálek claims he asked the agency if the vlogger was linked to any suspicious activities and was firmly assured that he was not. Reassured by these responses and the seemingly harmless content, Michálek concluded the collaboration posed no issues.

This is not an isolated case of an influencer being approached by a private agency or company based outside China. For instance, in 2023, Shein – a fast-fashion company founded in China and now based in Singapore, which faces allegations of forced labor and other human rights abuses – invited a group of social media influencers on a paid trip to Guangzhou. This resulted in videos produced by the influencers showcasing clean factories and content workers.

Going back to Michálek, the same agency approached him again about six months ago with an offer of a trip to Beijing, with the Chinese side offering to cover his flights and other expenses and even take him to a destination of his choice. Michálek accepted and chose Guangzhou, where he was accompanied (and filmed) by a Czech-speaking crew from China Radio International (CRI). Not only did Michálek insist that he asked locals “critical questions” and highlighted things he found unusual, but he also claimed he did not feel as though he was promoting anything, which is why he believes CRI never published the footage. It was only after a phone call with an acquaintance that he became concerned about a possibility of the footage being used for propaganda purposes.

All of this follows a familiar Chinese playbook. Individuals who have some influence over domestic discourse – such as politicians, academics, journalists, and increasingly social media influencers – are often approached with seemingly innocent opportunities to discuss shared interests. They may then be invited to visit China, with all expenses covered by the Chinese side. During these visits, they are accompanied by individuals and companies affiliated with the party-state, such as the CRI crew in Michálek’s case, who make sure to attend to their needs while fostering the impression that they are honored guests. These trips are often followed by offers of paid collaborations, which may appear low stakes at first but can ultimately result in unintended consequences, including fostering favorable attitudes toward Chinese narratives among relevant audiences.

[...]

Although influencers like Michálek may face criticism for being paid by Beijing to promote its propaganda, China’s approach to cultivating influencers is often more subtle and difficult to untangle, combining restrictions, nudges, and rewards. The rewards go beyond paid trips to include seminars, contests, campaigns, and other perks. The content influencers post may appear to be their own, yet it is often co-created in specialized influencer studios with the help of so-called “multi-channel networks” (MCNs), which are organizations dedicated to spreading CCP propaganda while helping influencers monetize their content on platforms like YouTube.

[...]

In stark contrast to the favorable treatment of CCP-friendly influencers, Western journalists investigating regions like Xinjiang face harassment, surveillance, and restricted access, while the Chinese public is encouraged to view them as agents of foreign influence.

[...]

[Edit typo.]

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Archived link

A lawyer for Shein summoned to a British parliamentary hearing evaded questions Tuesday on whether the fast-fashion giant sells products containing cotton from China, angering lawmakers seeking answers on the retailer’s labor practices and allegations of forced labor in its supply chains.

Executives from Shein and its rival Temu were grilled on their labor rights compliance and how they source their products at Parliament’s business and trade committee Tuesday. The hearing came amid reports that Shein, which was founded in China but is now based in Singapore, is preparing for a 50 billion-pound ($62 billion) listing on the London Stock Exchange in the first quarter of this year.

Both global retailers are growing in popularity worldwide for selling mostly Chinese-made clothes and products at bargain prices. But they have drawn criticism over allegations that their supply chains may be tainted by forced labor, including from China’s far-west Xinjiang province, where rights groups say serious human rights abuses were committed by Beijing against members of the ethnic Uyghur group and other Muslim minorities.

Yinan Zhu, general counsel at Shein in London, declined to answer repeated questions at the hearing on whether cotton from Xinjiang or elsewhere in China is present in the products it sells.

[...]

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Archived link

Taiwan suspects a Chinese-owned cargo vessel damaged an undersea cable near its northeastern coast Friday, in an alleged act of sabotage that highlights the vulnerabilities of Taipei’s offshore communications infrastructure.

The ship is owned by a Hong Kong-registered company whose director is a mainland Chinese citizen, the Financial Times reported Sunday. An unidentified Taiwanese official cited in the report described the case as sabotage.

The incident followed another Chinese vessel’s suspected involvement in the breakages of data cables in the Baltic Sea in November. While fishing trawlers are known to sometimes damage such equipment, nation states have also been accused of deliberate sabotage, although it can be difficult to prove.

“This is why Taiwan needs to build its telecommunication resilience, and strengthen its situation awareness in the surrounding waters,” said Sheu Jyh-shyang, assistant research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute of National Defense and Security Research. “Otherwise, the system would be easily undermined, and it would be difficult to hold the suspect accountable.”

[...]

The damage didn’t affect connection because data was immediately rerouted to other cables, Taiwan’s Chunghwa Telecom Co. said in a Saturday statement. The company co-owns the cable system along with the AT&T Inc. in the US and regional operators including Japan’s Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp. and China Telecom Corp., according to the FT.

Taiwan has asked South Korea for help with the investigation as the ship is due to arrive in Busan in the coming days, according to a Taiwanese national security official.

The integrity of undersea cables has been a rising security concern in Taiwan, which China claims as its territory and has threatened to take with force if necessary. As recently as in 2023, telecommunication services in Taiwan’s Matsu Islands were disrupted for months after Chinese fishing vessels cut the cables.

[...]

[Edit typo.]

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Archived link

As the world watches China’s increasingly aggressive moves at sea, its quiet expansion across land borders in the Himalayas serves as a reminder that its ambitions extend far beyond the South China Sea or Taiwan. China is methodically expanding its reach, targeting small, vulnerable neighbors like Nepal and Bhutan.

Across from Nepal’s Humla District, a small, seemingly insignificant border marker near the village of Hilsa has become a powerful symbol of the region’s shifting geopolitical tides. This remote area, nestled high in the Himalayas, is now a quiet battleground where China is advancing its territorial claims in incremental, persistent ways. Fortifications have sprung up, guarded by high-tech surveillance and armed patrols, forming a stark divide between the barren Nepali side and newly robust Chinese infrastructure just across the border.

Glass-walled buildings, flood-lit roads, and modern facilities contrast sharply with Nepal’s underdeveloped and rugged terrain, signaling China’s increasing dominance in this remote region.

A 2021 fact-finding mission led by Nepali officials revealed the extent of China’s incursion, yet the report was buried—kept from public view and even high-ranking Nepali politicians.

The stark infrastructure imbalance underscores not only the widening gap between the two nations but also China’s deeper motives: to cement its hold on disputed territories and slowly push its influence beyond its borders.

For decades, Nepal provided a haven for Tibetans fleeing Chinese repression. Today, however, the stream of refugees has nearly dried up, with China’s expansion in Tibet and Xinjiang cutting off traditional escape routes and leaving Tibetans more isolated and controlled than ever. The network of surveillance and barriers erected across Tibet serves as a wall, both literally and figuratively, against those seeking refuge in Nepal. This shift is part of a broader trend under Xi Jinping, where hard-line policies in border areas seek to secure and extend China’s reach and control.

While Nepal contends with creeping encroachment, the stakes are even higher for Bhutan. In recent years, China has constructed 22 villages within Bhutan’s traditional borders, claiming about 2% of the small country’s territory. These settlements come complete with roads, military posts, and administrative centers, essentially creating new facts on the ground that are difficult to reverse.

For Bhutan, this encroachment has presented a grim dilemma: either concede these strategic lands or face the risk of escalating tensions.

**Bhutan’s situation mirrors China's gray-zone occupation strategy in the South China Sea, where it has transformed reefs and islands into fortified bases, altering the status quo and asserting control without risking direct conflict. **

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Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te pledged to strengthen the island’s defenses in the face of escalating Chinese threats, saying in a New Year’s address on Wednesday that Taiwan was a crucial part of the “line of defense of democracy” globally.

China claims Taiwan, a self-ruled democracy, is part of its territory and has vowed to annex the island by force if necessary.

“Authoritarian countries such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran are still collaborating to threaten the international order that is based on rules. This has severely influenced the Indo-Pacific region and the world’s peace and stability,” Lai said in his address.

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Lai also issued a warning about the need to uphold democracy domestically, addressing recent political controversies in Taiwan.

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China has reportedly constructed new military outposts in the Tawang Valley, according to an analysis of high-resolution satellite images.

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The satellite analysis indicates the presence of three new outposts in the region. These positions are strategically located to restrict Indian patrol routes in three directions, effectively reducing the extent of patrol areas claimed by Indian forces.

The satellite imagery underscores China’s swift construction efforts in the aftermath of the troop disengagement.

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The Tawang Valley has long been a flashpoint in the broader Sino-Indian border dispute. Located near the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it has been a site of frequent tensions and standoffs between the two countries’ militaries. Both sides agreed to disengage following heightened tensions earlier in the year, with each withdrawing troops from forward positions.

However, the latest developments indicate that China has leveraged the disengagement period to fortify positions behind the LAC. Analysts believe these outposts are designed to provide a tactical advantage by monitoring and restricting Indian troop movements in the area.

China’s rapid construction of infrastructure along disputed borders is not new. Over the years, it has developed roads, airstrips, and bases in contested areas to assert its claims and improve its logistical capabilities. In Tawang Valley, these new outposts appear to follow a similar pattern, enabling Beijing to maintain control over the region despite agreements to scale back military presence.

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Videos circulating on social media show Chinese men from mainland provinces quickly obtaining marriage certificates with Uyghur women through government-supported matchmaking agencies. This represents a new wave of state-encouraged intermarriage.

Chinese men openly promote "marrying beautiful Uyghur girls" on platforms like Douyin and WeChat, causing serious concern among Uyghurs abroad.

Zumrat Dawut, a camp survivor, confirms such matchmaking companies now operate in most East Turkistan cities. Recent months have seen a marked increase in Uyghur-Chinese marriages, with some previously married Uyghur women recruiting others.

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A Mekit-based company called "Hot Love," the only government-approved matchmaking service there, revealed they receive state support and financial incentives (40,000 yuan) for arranging Uyghur-Chinese marriages. They exclusively match Uyghur women with mainland Chinese men.

The Uyghur Human Rights Project's 2022 report identified this as systematic government policy promoting forced intermarriage as part of cultural genocide.

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In December 2019, a number of human rights activists met in the southeastern city of Xiamen for a dinner and discussion of social issues. From the 26th of that month, and over the weeks that followed, Chinese authorities forcibly disappeared human rights lawyer Ding Jiaxi and legal scholar Xu Zhiyong until they re-surfaced in government detention.

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“The Xiamen crackdown epitomizes the Chinese authorities’ all-out assault on civil society and the cruelty with which they treat peaceful rights advocates,” said Sarah Brooks, Amnesty International’s China Director.

At least five other activists were also targeted and detained for their affiliation with the gathering. In the months that followed, all seven activists were reportedly held in “residential surveillance at a designated location” (RSDL), a form of secret incommunicado detention that places detainees at increased risk of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.

“Over the past five years, Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi – along with several of their companions – have endured arbitrary detention, torture and unfair trials merely because they attended a private gathering and discussed the civil society situation and current affairs in China.”

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Both Ding and Xu have been the subject of recommendations to Chinese authorities by multiple governments and by UN officials, including High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk. Yet concrete actions to demand access to these individuals or to increase the consequences to Chinese authorities for their crackdown on human rights defenders have not materialized.

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“The Chinese authorities must immediately release Ding and Xu and stop punishing all those who participated in the Xiamen gathering. The grim picture painted by their continued imprisonment should galvanize international condemnation for China’s crackdown on civil society,” Sarah Brooks [from Amnesty] said.

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China’s extraction of rare earth minerals in Myanmar has reached unprecedented levels, according to a report by Irrawaddy, which said the plunder of minerals had caused an “environmental catastrophe” in Kachin state.

Chinese customs data revealed a “staggering 70% growth in imports” in 2023, with shipments reaching 34,241 metric tons.

It suggested China was exploiting the country while it is engaged in the worst civil strife since independence, saying “Beijing’s aggressive stockpiling strategy extends far beyond its domestic requirements” and that “China is hoarding resources to weaponize them against potential future sanctions.”

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Chinese companies said to be operating via “a complex web of local proxies and shadowy partnerships, had expanded operations by over 40%, to the point where Myanmar is now “China’s primary source of heavy rare earths, supplying approximately 40% of crucial elements like dysprosium, yttrium, and terbium.

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Local communities had complained of severe health impacts – skin diseases, respiratory problems and internal organ damage. But their concerns were ignored by the ruling junta, because it “depends on Chinese support for survival.”

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The report also says:

The human cost is equally devastating. Indigenous communities in Kachin have been displaced from their ancestral lands, their traditional farming areas transformed into toxic mining zones. The Business and Human Rights Resource Center documents numerous violations, including forced relocations, labor abuses, and the destruction of cultural heritage sites. Yet these abuses continue unchecked, hidden from international scrutiny by Myanmar’s isolation.

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Debt and overinvestment have caused productivity decline and deflation. With debt levels soaring to 350% of gross domestic product (GDP), each yuan injected into the economy yields diminishing returns. Adding to the challenge is overinvestment of nearly 45% of China's GDP funneled into projects that now face declining domestic demand. This flood of excess capacity has led to deflationary pressures in both producer and consumer prices.

China's property market, once an anchor of the country's wealth, has become a liability, with more than 60 million empty units. Property represents about 60% of a Chinese family's net worth, compared to 27% in the U.S., eroding consumer confidence. Efforts to boost domestic consumption have largely fallen short. Unlike in the U.S., where lower interest rates typically encourage consumption, the Chinese are reluctant to spend, concerned about falling property values and the absence of a strong social security net.

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Since the global financial crisis, China has rolled out five major stimulus packages. Each intervention has provided a short-term market lift coinciding with a cyclical boost to growth, but as evidenced in the last cycle of 2022, such effects are beginning to wane. Japan's "Lost Decade," beginning in the 1990s, provides a sobering parallel. Following its economic peak in the 1980s, Japan experienced long-term stagnation interspersed with brief market rallies that averaged 45% within a downward market trend.

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In China, stimulus increases supply rather than demand, leading to excess capacity, which it exports.

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Bottom line: We believe there are no quick fixes for China's economic quandary. Only a complete debt restructuring, followed by bank recapitalization and government-led redistribution will drive meaningful, positive change. It will no doubt be painful. Until China addresses the root issues—excessive debt and inefficient investment—stimulus measures may provide fleeting relief but will remain mere band-aids.

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Independent field investigations in China’s Yunnan Province found labor violations at coffee farms that supply coffees purchased and certified as sustainable by coffee giants Starbucks and Nestlé, according to a new report from two labor watchdog groups.

A joint effort from the New York-based nonprofit China Labor Watch and a new Danish nonprofit called Coffee Watch, the report alleges a pattern of “ghost farms” and “coffee laundering,” through which larger coffee producer groups, or certified estates, avoid detailed contractual relationships with the smaller farms supplying them.

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China Labor Watch’s three separate investigations into coffee farms that allegedly supply Starbucks and Nestlé included interviews with 66 individuals, including coffee farmers, their families and teachers from local schools.

The investigations found “substantial abuses” in Starbucks’ and Nestlé’s supply chains, especially among indigenous farming communities.

“These abuses violated the terms of both companies’ certification schemes, namely C.A.F.E. Practices that is run by Conservation International for Starbucks, and 4C which Nestlé uses,” the report states.

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The Czech Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a resolution last week condemning the Chinese government’s manipulation of a key United Nations resolution on Taiwan. Similar initiatives in the parliaments of Australia, The Netherlands, the European Union, Canada, and the United Kingdom over the previous months called out Beijing’s longstanding campaign to block Taiwan’s democratic government from participating in U.N. activities. Governments willing to tackle this challenge also should confront Beijing’s strikingly similar threat to the U.N. human rights system.

At a time of global backsliding on democracy and human rights, these efforts may seem niche or Quixotic. But democracies defending one another, particularly through their own domestic institutions and not only as a matter of foreign policy, demonstrates a principled commitment. Few issues matter more to Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping than retaking control of Taiwan, and his regime has lashed out at other governments taking milder positions on the issue. But these six democracies have recognized that Xi’s posture threatens them and the U.N., one of the key international institutions on which they rely, creating considerable diplomatic momentum for a position that was unimaginable at the beginning of 2024.

The parliamentary efforts are informed by groundbreaking report earlier this year by scholars Bonnie S. Glaser and Jacques deLisle for the German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Exposing the PRC’s Distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to Press its Claims Over Taiwan.” It details Beijing’s decades-long efforts to launder its claims of sovereignty through the United Nations.

But the political pathologies detailed — and the recommendations offered — could equally apply to Beijing’s efforts to undermine human rights at the world’s flagship body. The similarities cannot be an accident: “flawed legal assumptions” (as Glaser and deLisle put it), decades of pressure, diplomatic capitulations, and weak responses from democracies neatly summarize how Xi seeks to neutralize U.N. human rights initiatives.

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Hundreds of Tibetans protesting against a Chinese dam were rounded up in a harsh crackdown earlier this year, with some beaten and seriously injured, the BBC has learnt from sources and verified footage.

Such protests are extremely rare in Tibet, which China has tightly controlled since it annexed the region in the 1950s. That they still happened highlights China's controversial push to build dams in what has long been a sensitive area.

Claims of the arrests and beatings began trickling out shortly after the events in February. In the following days authorities further tightened restrictions, making it difficult for anyone to verify the story, especially journalists who cannot freely travel to Tibet.

But the BBC has spent months tracking down Tibetan sources whose family and friends were detained and beaten. BBC Verify has also examined satellite imagery and verified leaked videos which show mass protests and monks begging the authorities for mercy.

The sources live outside of China and are not associated with activist groups. But they did not wish to be named for safety reasons.

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The protests, followed by the crackdown, took place in a territory home to Tibetans in Sichuan province. For years, Chinese authorities have been planning to build the massive Gangtuo dam and hydropower plant, also known as Kamtok in Tibetan, in the valley straddling the Dege (Derge) and Jiangda (Jomda) counties.

Once built, the dam's reservoir would submerge an area that is culturally and religiously significant to Tibetans, and home to several villages and ancient monasteries containing sacred relics.

One of them, the 700-year-old Wangdui (Wontoe) Monastery, has particular historical value as its walls feature rare Buddhist murals.

The Gangtuo dam would also displace thousands of Tibetans. The BBC has seen what appears to be a public tender document for the relocation of 4,287 residents to make way for the dam.

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China is no stranger to controversy when it comes to dams.

When the government constructed the world's biggest dam in the 90s - the Three Gorges on the Yangtze River - it saw protests and criticism over its handling of relocation and compensation for thousands of villagers.

In more recent years, as China has accelerated its pivot from coal to clean energy sources, such moves have become especially sensitive in Tibetan territories.

Beijing has been eyeing the steep valleys and mighty rivers here, in the rural west, to build mega-dams and hydropower stations that can sustain China's electricity-hungry eastern metropolises. President Xi Jinping has personally pushed for this, a policy called "xidiandongsong", or "sending western electricity eastwards".

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The Chinese government has long been accused of violating Tibetans' rights. Activists say the dams are the latest example of Beijing's exploitation of Tibetans and their land.

"What we are seeing is the accelerated destruction of Tibetan religious, cultural and linguistic heritage," said Tenzin Choekyi, a researcher with rights group Tibet Watch. "This is the 'high-quality development' and 'ecological civilisation' that the Chinese government is implementing in Tibet."

One key issue is China's relocation policy that evicts Tibetans from their homes to make way for development - it is what drove the protests by villagers and monks living near the Gangtuo dam. More than 930,000 rural Tibetans are estimated to have been relocated since 2000, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).

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Multiple Tibetan rights groups [...] argue that any large-scale development in Tibetan territory, including dams such as Gangtuo, should be halted.

They have staged protests overseas and called for an international moratorium, arguing that companies participating in such projects would be "allowing the Chinese government to profit from the occupation and oppression of Tibetans".

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On International Human Rights Day, a protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Vienna united Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Christians demanding an end to Chinese Communist Party oppression. Demonstrators called for global action against the ongoing human rights abuses and systemic oppression of marginalized communities in China by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

On International Human Rights Day, a significant protest unfolded outside the Chinese Embassy in Vienna as Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Chinese Christians united against ongoing oppression by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The event, spearheaded by the Tibetan Community Organisation in Vienna, spotlighted widespread human rights abuses by the Chinese authorities.

Leading the demonstration, Tibetan diaspora members waved flags and held banners condemning the CCP's persistent violations in Tibet. They voiced concerns over issues such as the demolition of monasteries, enforced relocation of Tibetan children, and what many called cultural genocide. The protesters urged global recognition of these atrocities and pressed for international intervention to halt Chinese repressive policies.

Uyghur activists stood alongside their Tibetan peers, highlighting the severe persecution faced by Uyghurs, including mass detentions, forced labor, and the destruction of religious sites. Joined by Chinese Christians, who protested against the state's control over religious practices, they collectively demanded an end to CCP tyranny and urged the world to hold China accountable.

[Edit to include the link.]

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The Presidential Office yesterday called on China to stop all “provocative acts,” saying ongoing Chinese military activity in the nearby waters of Taiwan was a “blatant disruption” of the “status quo” of security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Defense officials said they have detected Chinese ships since Monday, both off Taiwan and farther out along the first island chain. They described the formations as two walls designed to demonstrate that the waters belong to China.

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Taiwan has been expecting drills following stops by President William Lai (賴清德) in Hawaii and the US territory of Guam during an overseas trip to diplomatic allies in the Pacific last week.

Presidential Office spokeswoman Karen Kuo (郭雅慧) in a statement said that China’s military actions were a “blatant disruption” of regional stability and Beijing should immediately stop all “provocative acts.”

She said that it is customary for presidents to go overseas and that “Taiwan’s normal international exchanges with other countries are not an excuse for China’s provocations.”

Meanwhile, the Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) yesterday demanded China cease its military intimidation and “irrational behavior” that endangers regional peace and stability.

[Edit typo.]

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Here is the full report (pdf, 28 pages)

China is rapidly advancing its global propaganda strategies through international communication centers (ICCs), with over 100 centers established since 2018 — most since 2023. These centers aim to amplify the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) voice on the international stage, targeting specific audiences with tailored messaging (a strategy known as “precise communication”). ICCs coordinate local, national, and international resources to build China's image, share political narratives, and promote economic partnerships.

By leveraging inauthentic social media amplification, foreign influencers, and collaborations with overseas media, ICCs advance China’s multi-layered propaganda approach. For instance, Fujian's ICC reportedly manages TikTok accounts targeting Taiwanese audiences, likely including a covert account that is highly critical of the Taiwan government called Two Tea Eggs. On YouTube, the same ICC promotes videos of Taiwanese individuals praising China. These centers are strategically positioned to promote China's interests during geopolitical crises, despite challenges like limited credibility and resource constraints.

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ICCs employ various tactics to achieve their objectives. Social media operations form a core component of their strategy, with thousands of accounts active across platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok. Many of these accounts lack transparency about their state affiliations, enabling covert influence campaigns. Additionally, ICCs leverage foreign influencers and “communication officers” to amplify China’s narratives through user-generated content, vlogs, and experiential propaganda.

Collaboration with overseas media organizations further enhances ICCs' reach and legitimacy. Through actions like organizing foreign journalist visits to China, ICCs create an impression of organic coverage and offer an alternative to Western narratives. These partnerships — reportedly established in Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, Egypt, France, Japan, Russia, the United States, and elsewhere — are complemented by localized propaganda activities that align with China’s economic and geopolitical interests.

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