China

Archived

China has revised its policy on the administration of Tibetan Buddhist temples, focusing especially on Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism with “a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation”, according to a Dharamshala-based Tibetan rights group.

China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs issued a revised version of its “Measures for the Administration of Tibetan Buddhist Temples” on Dec 1, 2024 – after being adopted on Sep 1 – and it came into force at the beginning of last month, said the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy Feb 14.

It said a major revision made in Article 4, which outlines the ideological framework within which the Communist Party of China (CPC) requires Tibetan monasteries to function, states:

“Temples and clergy should love the motherland, support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support the socialist system, abide by the Constitution, laws, regulations, rules, and relevant provisions on the management of religious affairs, practice core socialist values, forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation, adhere to the direction of the Sinicization of religion, uphold the principle of independence and self-management, safeguard national unity, ethnic unity, religious harmony, and social stability, and promote the adaptation of Tibetan Buddhism to socialist society.”

Archived

An Australian man says an extortion attempt at an electronics repair store landed him in a Beijing jail, where he was forced to confess to stealing his own phone.

Australian Matthew Radalj was running a clothing business out of Beijing in January 2020 when he left his apartment one morning to collect his phone from an electronics market, where he had dropped it off days earlier for repairs.

What happened next would land him in jail for nearly the next five years, the victim, in his retelling of events, of an extortion attempt and a justice system that convicts 99 per cent of those who come before it.

Under what he says were torturous conditions, he would be forced to confess to robbery charges for stealing his own phone and cash and to violently resisting arrest.

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Each morning, the inmates would be forced to march into the factory to the tune of Chinese Communist Party propaganda “red” songs. The lyrics are burnt into his brain: Wo ai ni zhongguo.

“It means ‘I love you, China’,” says Radalj. “The Chinese system is designed to extract as much suffering from you as possible. At a certain point, you’re not even human any more.”

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Radalj says when he arrived at the electronics market on January 3, 2020, the shop owner, a man called Wei, had more than doubled the agreed price to fix his smashed yellow iPhone 11 and put a new deal on the table. It was now going to cost him 3500 yuan ($767), but Wei’s friend would buy the phone for 1000 yuan and settle his debt. Radalj rejected the deal, paid the original price, took his phone and left.

But as he was exiting the market, he was set upon by security guards carrying pepper spray and electric batons. He fought back, he says, grabbing the pepper spray and using it on one of the security officers and stunning another with a baton he seized in the brawl before being chased into the street, where he was subdued by a mob.

“I had to basically fight for my life,” he says.

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After his arrest, Radalj says he endured cruel treatment at a detention centre until he agreed to sign a “leniency document” confessing to the robbery charges. He was left in rooms for long stretches with static playing through speakers, and he was forced to strip naked and go outside in Beijing’s sub-zero winter. For 10 months, he had no access to money, meaning he couldn’t buy a toothbrush, toilet paper or underwear, nor could he call his family or friends, who were becoming increasingly worried.

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Radalj says he was held in Beijing Number 3 Detention Centre for 504 days before being transferred to Beijing Number 2 Prison, where he spent 1230 days.

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Radalj’s story is an apparent example of how a confluence of circumstance, harsh laws and policing, and geopolitical jostling can conspire in a devastating way to leave foreigners at the mercy of China’s unflinching legal system.

His situation was worsened by the arrival of the coronavirus pandemic, during which the prison was sealed off. It also made consular access difficult and soured the Australia-China relationship during the Morrison government era.

“Even in the police station, they were saying, ‘You’re Australian. This is China. Australia is not our friend’,” Radalj says.

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Archived

Here is the study (pdf).

TLDR:

• Recent suspicious activities conducted by the merchant vessels Shunxing-39 and Vasili Shukshin in the vicinity of Taiwan in early 2025 suggest possible collaboration between Chinese and Russian merchant ships related to the reconnaissance and sabotage of undersea communications cables that connect Taiwan to the outside world.
• Such activities follow from suspected undersea infrastructure sabotage operations conducted by Chinese merchant vessels in the Baltic Sea in 2023–2024, with strong indications of Russian assistance and coordination.
• Taken as a whole, this string of incidents suggests an increasing willingness by Moscow and Beijing to collaborate on maritime sabotage operations—include on attacks on third-party targets.

Taiwan's government warns its people of visiting China, Hong Kong or Macau. Former government employees, people who have participated in civil movements or criticized China, and those working on sensitive technologies are considered at high risk of detention or interrogation.

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The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) has since Jan. 1 last year received 65 petitions regarding Taiwanese who were interrogated or detained in China, MAC Minister Chiu Chui-cheng (邱垂正) said yesterday.

Fifty-two either went missing or had their personal freedoms restricted, with some put in criminal detention, while 13 were interrogated and temporarily detained, he said in a radio interview.

On June 21 last year, China announced 22 guidelines to punish “die-hard Taiwanese independence separatists,” allowing Chinese courts to try people in absentia.

The guidelines are uncivilized and inhumane, allowing Beijing to seize assets and issue the death penalty, with no regard for potential repercussions for family and friends of the accused, Chiu said.

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Those who work in [Taiwanese] government agencies or institutions are often questioned on arrival in China for 30 minutes to four hours, and their suitcases and laptops might be searched, he said, adding that academics who support the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) are not exempt from such checks.

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[Edit typo.]

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Here is the study The Silent Withdrawal (pdf).

In The Silent Withdrawal, Dian Zhong - research fellow at the Hoover History Lab specializing in the comparative political economy of development with a focus on gender dynamics - reveals a striking reversal in China’s once-celebrated gender equality, as women increasingly withdraw from the workforce despite higher education levels. Highlighting the policy missteps and the unintended consequences of pro-natalist measures, alongside the transformation of feminism from state collaboration to a force of resistance, Zhong calls for bold reforms to reconcile women’s economic empowerment with demographic challenges, steering China toward a more inclusive future.

Key takeaways:

• A Quiet Crisis in China’s Workforce: Despite education gains, Chinese women are retreating from the workforce, facing widening wage gaps, underrepresentation in leadership, and mounting family pressures—a stark contrast to global gender equality trends.
• Policy Missteps Deepen Inequality: Government efforts to encourage fertility have inadvertently marginalized women economically, worsening labor discrimination and gender disparities.
• Feminism Evolves Under Pressure: Once a partner in state-driven agendas, feminist activism in China now stands at the crossroads of domestic demands and global scrutiny. Facing mounting pressures, it has transformed from collaboration with the state to a force of active resistance.
• Balancing Demographics with Inclusion: Inclusive policies are urgently needed to align women’s economic roles with the nation’s demographic challenges. Without such reforms, China risks losing the valuable contributions of female human capital while facing an impending demographic crisis.

Archived

In the beginning of February 2020, Chinese journalist Zhang Zhan heard rumours that an unidentified disease was killing citizens in the city of Wuhan. Despite the risk of contagion, she travelled 850 km to cover the situation on the ground, working in the epicentre of what turned out to be one of the deadliest pandemics in modern history. For this, she was sentenced to four years in prison as the Chinese regime tried to cover up news about the outbreak and their responsibility for the spread of the disease.

Five years later — after completing her first, unjust prison sentence — Zhang Zhan is in detention once again, arrested just a few weeks after sharing information about the harassment of human rights activists on social media. She has now been behind bars since August 2024 and recently started a hunger strike in protest of her mistreatment by the regime. According to RSF information, Zhang Zhan — who was already very weak prior herpast six months of detention — is being force-fed by prison authorities.

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Throughout her imprisonment, RSF campaigned for her release and warned about the mistreatment she was subjected to in prison. During her early months of detention, Zhang Zhan — laureate of the 2021 RSF Press Freedom Award — nearly died after going on a total hunger strike to protest her mistreatment. Prison officials forcibly fed her through a nasal tube and sometimes left her handcuffed for days.

China, the world’s biggest prison for journalists and press freedom defenders with at least 124 media workers currently behind bars, is ranked 172nd out of 180 countries in the RSF 2024 World Press Freedom Index.

Public anger in China over concerns raised by doctors that generic drugs used in public hospitals are increasingly ineffective has led to a rare response from the government.

Doctors say they believe the country's drug procurement system, which incentivises the use of cheap generic drugs over original brand-name pharmaceuticals, has led to costs being cut at the expense of people's safety.

But officials, quoted by multiple state media outlets on Sunday, say the issue is one of perception rather than reality.

One report said different people simply had different reactions to medicines and that claims about them being ineffective had "mostly come from people's anecdotes and subjective feelings".

The official response has done little to allay public fears over the reputation of drugs in public hospitals and pharmacies. It is the latest challenge to a healthcare system that is already under enormous strain because of a rapidly ageing population.

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Archived

China last year began construction on projects with the greatest combined coal power capacity since 2015, jeopardising the country’s goal to peak carbon emissions by 2030, according to a report [...] from the Finland-based Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) and Global Energy Monitor (GEM) in the United States, China began construction on 94.5 gigawatts of coal power projects in 2024 — 93 percent of the global total.

Although the country also added a record 356 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity — 4.5 times the European Union’s additions — the uptick in coal power risks solidifying its role in China’s energy mix, the report said.

“China’s rapid expansion of renewable energy has the potential to reshape its power system, but this opportunity is being undermined by the simultaneous large-scale expansion of coal power,” said Qi Qin, lead author of the report and China analyst at CREA.

The rise comes despite a pledge by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2021 to “strictly control” coal power projects and increases in coal consumption before “phasing it down” between 2026 and 2030.

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Coal prioritised

New permits for coal power projects fell 83 percent in the first half of 2024, prompting optimism that China’s clean energy transition was gathering pace.

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But coal power surged in the latter months of 2024, despite the country adding enough power from clean energy sources to cover its growth in electricity demand.

That suggested coal power was being prioritised over renewable sources in some regions, the report said.

“Chinese coal power and mining companies are sponsoring and building new coal plants beyond what is needed,” said Christine Shearer, research analyst at GEM.

“The continued pursuit of coal is crowding out the country’s use of lower-cost clean energy.”

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Archived

As China aggressively expands its economic footprint across the globe, the recent scandal at BYD's Brazilian factory construction site has exposed the darker side of Chinese overseas investment. The discovery of 163 Chinese workers living in "slavery-like conditions" in Camaçari, Brazil, reveals how China's corporations are exporting not just their products and services, but also their oppressive labor practices beyond their borders. The details that emerged from the Brazilian labor inspector's investigation paint a disturbing picture of systematic exploitation. Workers building BYD's electric vehicle factory were forced to surrender their passports, which is a classic indicator of forced labor and submit to contracts laden with draconian conditions. These included an $890 deposit that could only be retrieved after six months of work, effectively trapping workers in their positions, and arbitrary fines for infractions as minor as walking shirtless or engaging in arguments.

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More revealing still are the discussions that emerged on Chinese social media platform Weibo, where some users noted that the conditions found in Brazil mirror those faced by construction workers within China itself. This acknowledgment hints at how China's domestic labor practices, characterized by the notorious "996" work culture (9 AM to 9 PM, six days a week), are being internationalized through its corporate expansion. The BYD Brazil scandal serves as a warning about the hidden costs of Chinese investment. While countries like Brazil eagerly court Chinese capital as part of their industrialization strategies, they must be vigilant about the potential for labor exploitation. The incident has already prompted Brazilian authorities to suspend temporary work visas for BYD, but more systematic safeguards are needed.

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This case also highlights the tension between economic development and worker rights. The BYD factory, built on the site of a former Ford plant, was supposed to symbolize Brazil's reindustrialization. Instead, it has become a symbol of how Chinese investment can undermine rather than enhance labor standards.

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The Chinese authorities, as part of their suppression of Tibetans’ basic rights, have taken aim at privately run educational institutions that promote Tibetan language and culture.

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Several vocational schools in eastern Tibet have been closed down since 2021, apparently without specific reasons being given.

Authorities have insisted that all students attend state schools. There, Tibetan children are now taught only in Chinese from primary to high school levels; such language policy has even been introduced in pre-primary schools. While Tibetan is still taught, it is now a stand-alone subject, much like a foreign language. This is contrary to the Chinese Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which guarantee the right to mother-tongue education.

Tibetan children in state schools are also subjected to a high degree of political education and, according to recent reports, military training. In January 2023, four United Nations special rapporteurs issued a statement of serious concern over China’s language and education policies in Tibet. The Chinese government has yet to provide a meaningful response.

Archived

An analysis by the China Labour Bulletin (CLB) 2024 labour data reveals a persistent disregard for workers' rights by employers, corporations, and government authorities, even as China's economic landscape shifts under the pressures of changing overseas investment, domestic demand, and evolving market structures across various sectors. Meanwhile, workers agitations in the manufacturing sector have surged to their highest levels in nearly a decade, despite a broader trend toward smaller-scale disputes, reflecting the transition to high-tech factories with fewer workers.

As companies prioritise cost-cutting measures and profitability strategies, workers' wages, social insurance, compensation, and living subsidies remain at the bottom of the list—if they are addressed at all. This growing tension underscores the widening gap between corporate interests and the basic rights of the labour force, painting a stark picture of the challenges facing workers in 2024.

In this report, CLB broadly analyses the raw data collected in our Strike Map and conducts a sector-by-sector analysis of issues affecting China’s workers and their rights.

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Workers in the construction industry continued to see their wages remain unpaid in 2024, with residential projects being the main targets of protests. Although the Strike Map recorded fewer incidents in the construction industry in 2024 (733 incidents) than in 2023 (945 incidents), the sector continued to have the highest proportion of protests among industries. Across the country, Guangdong (134 incidents), Shandong (78) and Henan (46) – provinces that have seen significant investments in real estate and infrastructure in recent years – recorded the highest numbers of protests, a proportion similar to that in 2023 with Shanxi dropping out of the top 3. Among the types of projects targeted that CLB could identify, 50 percent were related to residential projects, around 30 percent in infrastructure projects followed by 20 percent in commercial projects.

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CLB's Strike Map gathered information about 452 incidents in the manufacturing industry in 2024 – an increase from the previous year (438 cases) – at a time when international companies were eager to diversify their investments despite flat domestic demand. The incidents occurred mainly in the best-performing manufacturing provinces, with Guangdong witnessing a total of 166 incidents, followed by Zhejiang (63) and Jiangsu (39). While boasting of possessing the world’s biggest manufacturing economy, China’s manufacturing industry experienced another frustrating year in 2024.

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Last year, the Strike Map recorded 148 incidents in the services industry. Protests occurred predominantly in Guangdong (29 incidents) and Henan (13) followed by Sichuan (9) and Beijing (8). Three sectors that accounted for the most cases were catering (25.8 percent; 33 incidents), sanitation (24.2 percent; 31 incidents) and retail (14.1% percent; 18 incidents). Large-scale protests staged by hundreds of workers mainly occurred in the sanitation and medical sectors.

In the catering sector, protestors targeted big and small companies including restaurants and hotels, despite the backdrop of the national economy appearing to have improved slightly [while unemployment rates have risen].

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Of the 21 incidents recorded in the heavy industry, most occurred in the steel and metal sector (11 incidents), followed by the chemical sector (5). China recorded the highest steel exports in 2024 since 2015 but total output fell 1.7%. With the trend of urbanisation slowing down, the demand for steel for construction and infrastructure has fallen. The oversupply from steel mills as reflected in falling steel prices means competitive pressure in the sector. Market pressures along with bad management leaves workers in limbo as happened in the case of Xiangfen County XinJinShan Special Steel in Linfen. After being laid off by the steel company in late August, workers protested twice in September (13th and 27th) to demand their wages and a decent compensation plan. After financial scandals such as funds being transferred out from the company, it said it was owing debts and salaries to over 2,000 workers, according to a notice in early September.

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Conclusion:

First, trade unions must prioritise accountability to workers. CLB’s research highlights that union chairpersons, in many instances, are corporate executives, creating a conflict of interest that prevents unions from truly representing workers. To address this, unions must actively engage with workers to understand their concerns and proactively communicate with enterprises to anticipate workplace changes that may affect workers' rights. CLB has long advocated for unions to reform their structures and practices to genuinely serve as representatives of workers, rather than reacting only after labour rights abuses occur.

Second, multinational corporations must be held accountable for labour rights violations in their supply chains. The enactment of new supply chain due diligence laws, such as Germany’s Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (2023) and the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (2024), provides a framework for greater corporate responsibility. At the United Nations Responsible Business and Human Rights Forum in September 2024, CLB presented its approach, demonstrating how workers in China use social media to share grievances and document labour rights violations, even in the face of internet censorship. This wealth of worker-generated information can hopefully enable companies to conduct due diligence and prevent human rights abuses in their supply chains.

The Chinese government is maintaining severe restrictions, conditions, and controls on Uyghurs who seek to travel abroad in violation of their internationally protected right to leave the country, Human Right Watch said today. The government has permitted Uyghurs in the diaspora to make restricted visits to Xinjiang, but with the apparent aim of presenting a public image of normalcy in the region.

Since the start of the Chinese government’s abusive Strike Hard Campaign in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2016, Chinese authorities have arbitrarily confiscated passports of Uyghurs in the region and imprisoned Uyghurs for contacting people abroad. While the authorities are now allowing some Uyghurs to apply for or are returning passports for travel internationally, they exert tight control over those who travel.

“The modest thaw in China’s travel restrictions has allowed some Uyghurs to briefly reunite with loved ones abroad after having no news for years, but the Chinese government’s travel restrictions are still used to oppress Uyghurs in Xinjiang and in the diaspora,” said Yalkun Uluyol, China researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Chinese government continues to deny Uyghurs their right to leave the country, restrict their speech and associations when abroad, and punish them for having foreign ties.”

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A Chinese company is facing backlash after it sent staff members to photograph other employees using the toilet and later posting the compromising images on the wall of the restroom. Shenzen-based Lixun Electro-Acoustic admitted it was creepily monitoring the employees, whilst explaining the rationale behind its decision, according to a report in South China Morning Post.

The company said it undertook the surveillance to warn employees against using the bathroom for too long with few spending time smoking while others played video games.

"The staff were spending too much time in the bathroom smoking or playing games, which made other staff uncomfortable," the company said.

"Smoking in the bathroom is prohibited and the purpose is to prevent people from staying in the bathroom for long periods of time due to video games and other activities."

Notably, when the worker would not open the bathroom door for long, the other staffer would stand on the ladder and use the phone to click the pictures.

As the controversy snowballed, the company said it had taken down the photos a few hours later because "they do not look good".

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• Taiwan is acting against media organizations operating in the country that are affiliated with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) party-state.
• In early January, Taiwan’s government revoked the operating license of the magazine Strait Herald following revelations about its influence and infiltration activities.
• A sharp increase in disinformation targeting Taiwan in 2024 has prompted robust countermeasures, legislative reforms, enhanced cognitive warfare defenses, and international collaboration to combat PRC influence operations.
• Calls to improve Taiwan’s national security framework, including by setting up courts dedicated to prosecuting espionage and infiltration cases, indicate how vulnerable Taiwan remains to digital and media influence operations.

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There are currently eight PRC media outlets operating in Taiwan with 12 correspondents, according to recent reporting. These include People’s Daily (人民日报), Xinhua News Agency (新华社), China Central Television (CCTV; 中央电视台), China National Radio (中央人民广播电台), China News Service (CNS;中新社), Xiamen Media Group (厦门卫视), Strait Herald (海峡导报), and Hunan Broadcasting System (湖南广电) (VOA, January 3). Although they ostensibly function as independent media organizations, all are party–state-controlled entities aligned with CCP strategic interests and objectives.

These outlets reinforce the Party’s propaganda strategy in Taiwan. Among them, six—People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, CCTV, China National Radio, CNS, and Hunan Broadcasting System—fall under the centralized management of the CCP’s Propaganda Department. Xinhua serves as Beijing’s primary news agency and global propaganda arm, while the People’s Daily operates as the official newspaper of the CCP, amplifying its policies and political messaging. CCTV and China National Radio are central broadcasters tasked with spreading pro-Beijing narratives. CNS, though smaller, is integral to united front operations, engaging in partnerships with Taiwanese organizations to subtly influence public opinion.

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Archived

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Ambassadors from France, Japan, the European Union, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia reaffirmed their commitment to safeguarding regional stability and maritime sovereignty during a maritime security forum organized by the Stratbase Institute in partnership with the French Embassy in the Philippines,

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Japanese Ambassador Endo Kazuya reiterated Japan’s commitment to upholding the rule of law as outlined in the UNCLOS.

“Japan stands ready to work closely with the Philippines, ASEAN, and the international community to advance a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” he declared.

European Union Delegation Ambassador Massimo Santoro underscored the importance of a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

“A region free from coercion is key to our collective stability, peace, and prosperity. Strategic partnerships are central to the EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, promoting cooperation over confrontation,” he explained.

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Archived

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More than 200,000 people in Hong Kong live in sub-divided flats like [...], often cloaked in a musty odour and plagued by bedbugs during sweltering summers.

The former British colony [which has been ruled by China since 1997], ranked as the world's most unaffordable city for a 14th consecutive year by survey company Demographia, has one of the world’s highest rates of inequality.

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Hong Kong aims to eliminate subdivided flats by 2049, a target set in 2021 by China’s top official overseeing the city. Beijing sees the housing woes as a serious social problem that helped fuel mass anti-government protests in 2019.

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Still, Hong Kong's roughly 110,000 sub-divided flats have become notorious for high rents, with a median floor rate of HK$50 ($6.43) a square foot, a survey by non-government body the Society for Community Organization (SoCO) showed in 2022.

For so-called “coffin” homes, each roughly the size of a single bed, the rate is even higher, at HK$140, exceeding a rate of about HK$35 for private homes.

“All I hope for is to quickly get into public housing,” said Wong Chi-kong, 76, who pays HK$2,900 ($370) for a space smaller than 50 sq ft (5 sq m). His toilet sits right beside his bed and under the shower head.

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About 1.4 million of Hong Kong’s population of about 7.5 million live in poverty, with the number of poor households rising to 619,000 in the first quarter of 2024, to account for about 22.7% of the total, says non-profit organisation Oxfam.

SoCO called for the new regulations to extend to “coffin” homes.

“This kind of bed homes is the shame of Hong Kong,” said its deputy director, Sze Lai-shan.

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“The most important thing is having a roof over my head, not worrying about getting sunburnt or rained on,” said Sum, who gave only his last name.

Chan, 45, who pays rent of HK$2,100 a month for his 2 sq m (22 sq ft) home, said he hoped public housing would finally enable him to escape the bedbugs.

“I applied in 2005,” he said, providing only one name. “I have been waiting [for public housing] for 19 years.”

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Addition:

Homelessness is defined differently around the world, making it difficult to compare the issue across countries.

Today, only 78 countries have official government data on Homelessness, according to the Institute of Global Homelessness (these countries are depicted in red on the map on the institute's website if you click the link). China does not provide such statistics for its mainland.

Also, methodologies as well as definitions of homelessness differ across countries. There are several internationally accepted methodologies for homeless data collection and efforts continue to standardize and improve enumeration for making data internationally comparable.

If successful, the move could provide Manila with one of its most influential platforms to challenge Beijing over its expansive South China Sea claims, reports China-based South China Morning Post (SCMP). A seat on the UNSC would allow Manila to spotlight China’s sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea, which conflict with the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone

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Securing a seat on the Security Council would allow Manila to spotlight China’s sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea, which conflict with the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and international law.

While any resolutions targeting China would almost certainly be vetoed by Beijing, a permanent member of the council, the effort itself could have significant diplomatic impact.

“The votes would embarrass Beijing,” said SCMP cited Greg Poling, director of the Southeast Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, as saying.

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The Philippines has a strong record to support its candidacy. Over six decades, it has contributed 14,000 troops to 21 UN peacekeeping missions and previously held a Security Council seat in 2004–2005.

Additionally, the Philippines has secured backing from its regional bloc, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Under a long-standing agreement, ASEAN members rotate their bids for non-permanent Security Council seats, and the Philippines’ turn has now arrived.

Additionally, it is likely to secure support of all Asean bloc members, who have agreed to support each other in a rotation on the UNSC.

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Archived

When Zhang Junjie was 17 he decided to protest outside his university about rules made by China's government. Within days he had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital and treated for schizophrenia.

Junjie is one of dozens of people identified by the BBC who were hospitalised after protesting or complaining to the authorities.

Many people we spoke to were given anti-psychotic drugs, and in some cases electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), without their consent.

While there have been reports for decades that hospitalisation is used in China as a way of detaining dissenting citizens without involving the courts, a leading Chinese lawyer has told the BBC that the issue - which legislation sought to resolve - has recently seen a resurgence.

Junjie says he was restrained and beaten by hospital staff before being forced to take medication.

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"The doctors told me I had a very serious mental disease… Then they tied me to a bed. The nurses and doctors repeatedly told me, because of my views on the party and the government, then I must be mentally ill. It was terrifying," he told the BBC World Service. He was there for 12 days.

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Just over a month after being discharged, Junjie was once again arrested. Defying a fireworks ban at Chinese New Year (a measure brought in to fight air pollution) he had made a video of himself setting them off. Someone uploaded it online and police managed to link it to Junjie.

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He was accused of "picking quarrels and troublemaking" - a charge frequently used to silence criticism of the Chinese government. Junjie says he was forcibly hospitalised again for more than two months.

After being discharged, Junjie was prescribed anti-psychotic drugs. We have seen the prescription - it was for Aripiprazole, used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.

"Taking the medicine made me feel like my brain was quite a mess," he says, adding that police would come to his house to check he had taken it.

Fearing a third hospitalisation, Junjie decided to leave China. He told his parents he was returning to university to pack up his room - but, in fact, he fled to New Zealand.

He didn't say goodbye to family or friends.

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Archived link

United Nations (UN) human rights experts have issued a communication letter to the Chinese government raising serious concerns about its recent history of human rights violations, in particular, its unlawful arrest and disappearance of rights defenders and individuals in Tibet and East Turkestan (Ch: Xinjiang). The communication highlights “recurring patterns of repression, including incommunicado detentions and enforced disappearances, which were intended to limit artistic, cultural, and religious expression, silence human rights defenders in these regions, and silence opposing or critical views.” The communication dated 14 November 2024 was made public on 14 January 2025.

In the communication, the experts called on the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to provide information on the fate and whereabouts of nine Tibetans, including Tsedo, Kori, Chugdar, Gelo, Bhamo, Lobsang Samten, Lobsang Trinley, Wangkyi, and Tsering Tashi. The communication also mentioned other human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, activists, and ethnic or religious minorities unlawfully imprisoned and disappeared.

Moreover, the experts questioned China about the facts and legal basis for the arrest, detention, charge, and sentence of the individuals mentioned above, along with whether their cases were classified as secret and the trials were closed. They explained how these actions conformed to China’s international human rights obligations.

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Archived link

• Chinese WeChat messaging app, an integral part of everyday life in China, has emerged into a state surveillance tool
• Specific 'community groups' encocurage users to monitor and report their neighbors to authorities
• WeChat is used also abroad to spread Chinese propaganda and misinformation among Chinese-speaking communities

WeChat, often described as a digital “Swiss army knife,” is a super app operated by Tencent, one of China’s tech giants. Launched in 2011, it has become an integral part of everyday life in China, boasting over 1.3 billion monthly active users. While the app’s use for messaging, shopping, bill payments, and access to government services is well-known, its role in the digitalization of police services has been largely overlooked. This raises an important question: To what extent has WeChat become a policing platform for Chinese authorities?

WeChat as a State Surveillance Tool

WeChat’s role in state surveillance is well-documented, particularly its ability to filter and censor keywords and images on both its domestic and international versions. Like other Chinese communication platforms, the app must comply with strict domestic laws, regulations and guidelines that enforce censorship, data privacy, and propaganda requirements.

Censorship in China has a long history. In 1998, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) – the national law enforcement and public security authority – built the Great Firewall to ensure that the country’s economic modernization was accompanied by the suppression of free speech.

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New regulations also hold internet companies legally responsible for real-time content moderation. This is in line with Xi Jinping’s 2016 speech at the Symposium on Cybersecurity and Informatization, during which he made it clear that internet companies must bear “primary responsibility” for content governance.

WeChat’s influence, however, extends beyond China. Researchers in Australia discovered that the app significantly shapes the political views of Chinese-speaking Australians. For instance, during the 2023 referendum on constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians through the creation of an advisory body called the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice, WeChat was one of the platforms used to spread misinformation, disinformation and fake news. This included content rooted in racism, conspiracy theories and colonial denial. Despite this, the app claims its services do not extend to Australia, with its representatives having refused to attend a Senate hearing on foreign interference on these grounds.

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The app’s integration into government services began in 2015 when Li Keqiang – then a State Council minister – introduced the “Internet+” reforms. These reforms aimed to address China’s slowing economic growth by leveraging big data for market regulation, management and supervisory systems, and public service delivery.

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For local police departments with limited resources, WeChat policing offered a quick and cost-effective way to meet government targets without significant investments in software updates.

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Some cities even established “community policing” groups reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, encouraging citizens to monitor their neighbors and report suspicious behavior.

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Today, WeChat is more than just a communications platform. It has become an essential part of China’s public security infrastructure, encompassing digitalized police services, and expanding surveillance capacities, with early reports on these already emerging.

Archived

The Government of Thailand must immediately halt the possible transfer of 48 Uyghurs to the People’s Republic of China, UN experts* said today, warning that the group was at real risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if they are returned.

“The treatment of the Uyghur minority in China is well-documented,” the experts said. “We are concerned they are at risk of suffering irreparable harm, in violation of the international prohibition on refoulement to torture.”

“The prohibition on refoulement prohibits the return or transfer in any manner whatsoever to a country where there is real risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” they recalled.

The experts urged Thailand to provide adequate and comprehensive medical care to the group of Uyghurs without delay.

The 48 Uyghurs are said to be part of a larger group of approximately 350 persons who were arrested in Thailand in 2014, after irregularly crossing the Thai border to seek protection in Thailand. It is alleged that they have been held in de facto incommunicado detention for over a decade, with no access to lawyers, family members, representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) or the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

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Archived

International Communication Centers, or ICCs, have been sprouting up across China at a blistering rate since 2018. Tasked with leveraging local expertise and fusing traditional and new media to amplify the Party’s external propaganda, their story is one we have been following closely for years. But one part of the PRC has remained a grey area on the map — the part of the country perhaps most in need of positive spin, the far-western Xinjiang region.

Then, in late December 2024, Xinjiang’s branch of the Cyberspace Administration of China (网信新疆) announced the launch of the Xinjiang International Communication Center (新疆国际传播中心), housed in its own purpose-built offices in regional capital Urumqi.

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A New Propaganda Nexus

Xinjiang Daily credits the new ICC with helping it to build a “matrix of foreign propaganda products.” One of the products they list is a website called Tianshan Net (天山网), which features videos from the new ICC and publishes content in English, Kazakh, Russian, and Uyghur. As we have written about before, China now conceives of external propaganda as an all-of-society effort pulling in various government and Party institutions. ICCs are not just production centers but hubs that serve to weave these different threads together.

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Despite [...] efforts to reel in tourists with its “ethnic minorities” — majorities in much of the region — Xinjiang is best known internationally for subjecting its ethnically Turkic and predominantly Muslim population to what the UN calls crimes against humanity. More than anywhere else in the country, Xinjiang needs to refurbish its reputation. Yet while ICCs have spread throughout wealthier provinces to the east, Xinjiang has had most of its overseas propaganda created by outlets headquartered in Beijing like Xinhua and the People’s Daily.

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Throughout 2024, Xinjiang’s government worked hard to cast off its poor reputation. In May, a special International Communication Research Center brought together members of the regional propaganda department to brainstorm new ways to “tell Xinjiang’s story well.” China’s annual World Media Summit also came to the regional capital [of Xinjiang], with executives from international news outlets like Reuters, AP, and CNN rubbing elbows with their counterparts at Xinhua, People’s Daily, and China Media Group.

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Xinjiang’s ICC, despite the long wait and the lofty expectations ascribed to it, is unlikely to give us any new, innovative content. But it’s merely one more weapon in what they have called “a smokeless war” for global public opinion.

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Thai officials had tried to persuade the detainees [who were detained in Thailand in 2014 after fleeing increasing repression in their hometown in China's Xinjiang province] to sign forms consenting to be sent back to China. When they realised what was in the forms, they refused to sign them.

The Thai government has denied having any immediate plans to send them back. But human rights groups believe they could be deported at any time.

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The last time Thailand deported Uyghur asylum seekers was in July 2015. Without warning, it put 109 of them onto a plane back to China, prompting a storm of protest from governments and human rights groups.

The few photos that were released show them hooded and handcuffed, guarded by large numbers of Chinese police officers. Little is known about what happened to them after their return. Other deported Uyghurs have received long prison sentences in secret trials.

The nominee for Secretary of State in the incoming Trump administration, Marco Rubio, has promised to press Thailand not to send the remaining Uyghurs back.

Their living conditions have been described by one human rights defender as "a hell on earth".

They are all being held in the Immigration Detention Centre (IDC) in central Bangkok, which houses most of those charged with immigration violations in Thailand. Some are there only briefly, while waiting to be deported; others are there much longer.

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• Doctors, medical students shun China's rural healthcare system
• Ageing villagers will need better healthcare
• Strategy imperils economy through demographic, other risks

Although China has made significant progress in improving its health care system, experts expect rural-urban inequalities to widen as the population ages.

China's development model is at a crossroads, say health and population experts, with a choice between much higher spending on pensions and healthcare or industrial upgrades and urbanisation, which Beijing sees as key to bolstering growth.

At a twice-a-decade meeting of the ruling Communist Party last year, Beijing promised to pursue both.

However, spending vast resources on rural healthcare was "not a good move" right now, a government adviser said.

"High-quality doctors are unwilling to live in rural areas and low-quality ones cannot provide good services. This is a structural problem," added the adviser, speaking on condition of anonymity, as the topic is a sensitive one.

"The key is building townships, which is lagging behind."

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Critics say that for China to choose urban and industrial investment over welfare programmes for its low-income rural population would present it with long-term growth risks greater than the short-term gains.

It could exacerbate overcapacity in factories, weaken consumption, and worsen the demographic crisis by pushing people into cities, where they take on busy jobs and live in small, costly apartments, so they tend to have fewer children.

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China's biggest healthcare challenge is attracting qualified medical staff to rural areas, said Shenglan Tang, a global health professor at Duke-Kunshan University.

Doctors and medical students cite low pay and heavy workloads. A lack of good schools and other facilities deters young health workers from moving families to the countryside, Tang said.

Over the past decade, the number of urban doctors almost doubled to 4.1 million, while the figure for rural doctors dropped 42% to 622,000, more than twice the rate at which the rural population shrank, National Health Commission data show.

Large cities like Chengdu, the capital of the western province of Sichuan, "extract the good doctors from the small cities. And the hospitals in the small cities extract the good doctors from rural areas," a Chengdu doctor said.

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High local government debt will make it difficult for China to boost investment in healthcare.

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Archived link

• China increases its aggressive tactics in the South China Sea, with the Philippines becoming a major target
• Philippine ships face increasing harassment, including blockades, ramming, and non-lethal weapons such as lasers and water cannons
• This large-scale maritime occupation infringes Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, displaying China’s growing confidence and belligerence

In recent years, we’ve seen China become more confident and confrontational, especially in the South China Sea region. Their aggressive tactics have intensified, with the Philippines now standing out as a primary target.

China is making full use of its considerable maritime power, pushing boundaries and displaying no signs of backing down – quite literally. There has been a marked increase in instances where Chinese ships have obstructed, rammed or swarmed the vessels of the island nation. Sounds like something from a pirate movie, doesn’t it? But this isn’t fiction.

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Infringement of Philippine Waters

The South China Sea also plays host to the Philippines’ internationally recognized exclusive economic zone (or EEZ). This basically means that the Philippines has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources in this area. It’s akin to having your own backyard, where you should be free to do what you need without interference.

However, what Manila now faces is a large-scale maritime invasion by what can only be described as a hostile imperial power. This is similar to having a territorial bully walk into your backyard and claim it as its own.

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To sum it up, the situation in the South China Sea reflects China’s rising audacity. [China's] belligerent maneuvers, particularly towards the Philippines, reveal a scenario of maritime machismo in full swing. In a world that so often extols the virtues of peace, diplomacy and respect for international boundaries, what China is doing is downright audacious.

With each swarming event, each blockade, and every powerful laser beam, the tension mounts further. However, the world watches and waits, hoping for a resolution that respects international law and the sanctity of sovereign waters.

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