Hotznplotzn

joined 5 months ago
 

The High Court of Galicia has made a landmark ruling today, which confirms that Spanish national and regional authorities have breached residents’ human rights according to both the Spanish Constitution and European human rights law, by failing to manage record levels of pollution from hundreds of pig and poultry farms in the A Limia region.

The Xunta de Galicia and the Miño-Sil River Basin Authority have been ordered to immediately adopt all necessary measures to guarantee the end to the odours and environmental degradation of the As Conchas reservoir and its surroundings, restoring the full enjoyment of the right to life.

This is a critical step in recognising that the devastating impacts of industrial agriculture are not just policy issues—they are human rights issues.

Lawyers say the case now paves the way for suffering communities to bring replica suits across Europe, to demand justice and protection from their authorities.

[...]

In the landmark ruling, published today, the court said:

“Human rights and environmental protection are interdependent. A sustainable environment is necessary for the full enjoyment of human rights, including the rights to life, to an adequate standard of living, to drinking water and sanitation, to housing, to participation in cultural life and to development."

[...]

 

Archiv-Link

Die chinesische KI-Anwendung Deepseek soll nach dem Willen der Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragten Louisa Specht-Riemenschneider wegen Verstößen gegen europäisches Recht in Deutschland aus den App-Stores fliegen. „China hat kein Datenschutzniveau, das unserer Datenschutz-Grundverordnung entspricht“, sagte sie den Zeitungen der Funke Mediengruppe. Daher seien Datenabflüsse nach China „äußerst kritisch“.

Kritik, Datenschutz werde zum Innovationshemmnis, wollte Specht-Riemenschneider nicht gelten lassen. „Datenschutz ist Vertrauensgarant. Das kann sogar ein Standortvorteil sein“, sagte die Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragte. „Was Innovation hemmt, ist Rechtsunsicherheit im Markt. Und die rührt auch von einem Wildwuchs in der Digitalgesetzgebung her.“ Gebraucht werde eine besser aufeinander abgestimmte Digitalgesetzgebung in Europa mit klaren Regeln auch für den Datenschutz, sagte Specht-Riemenschneider.

[...]

Behörden in Südkorea, Italien, Taiwan und Australien sind bereits gegen Deepseek vorgegangen. Die italienische Datenschutzbehörde leitete eine Untersuchung ein, um zu prüfen, ob die App gegen die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO) verstößt. In den USA gibt es kein landesweites Verbot, jedoch haben mehrere Bundesbehörden wie die Nasa und das Verteidigungsministerium ihren Mitarbeitern die Nutzung der App untersagt.

[...]

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38550444

The Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) application DeepSeek is set to be removed from app stores in Germany at the behest of the federal data protection officer, Louisa Specht-Riemenschneider, due to violations of European law.

"China does not have a level of data protection that corresponds to our General Data Protection Regulation," she told the newspapers of the Funke media group. Data transfers to China are "extremely critical," she said.

[...]

Specht-Riemenschneider said she supports the initiative of the Berlin data protection officer and did not accept criticism that data protection is a hindrance to innovation.

"Data protection is a guarantee of trust. It can even be a competitive advantage," said Specht-Riemenschneider. "What hinders innovation is legal uncertainty in the market. And this also stems from a proliferation of digital legislation."

She said that digital legislation in Europe must be better coordinated, with clear rules including for data protection.

Authorities in South Korea, Italy, Taiwan and Australia have already taken action against DeepSeek.

[...]

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38550444

The Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) application DeepSeek is set to be removed from app stores in Germany at the behest of the federal data protection officer, Louisa Specht-Riemenschneider, due to violations of European law.

"China does not have a level of data protection that corresponds to our General Data Protection Regulation," she told the newspapers of the Funke media group. Data transfers to China are "extremely critical," she said.

[...]

Specht-Riemenschneider said she supports the initiative of the Berlin data protection officer and did not accept criticism that data protection is a hindrance to innovation.

"Data protection is a guarantee of trust. It can even be a competitive advantage," said Specht-Riemenschneider. "What hinders innovation is legal uncertainty in the market. And this also stems from a proliferation of digital legislation."

She said that digital legislation in Europe must be better coordinated, with clear rules including for data protection.

Authorities in South Korea, Italy, Taiwan and Australia have already taken action against DeepSeek.

[...]

 

The Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) application DeepSeek is set to be removed from app stores in Germany at the behest of the federal data protection officer, Louisa Specht-Riemenschneider, due to violations of European law.

"China does not have a level of data protection that corresponds to our General Data Protection Regulation," she told the newspapers of the Funke media group. Data transfers to China are "extremely critical," she said.

[...]

Specht-Riemenschneider said she supports the initiative of the Berlin data protection officer and did not accept criticism that data protection is a hindrance to innovation.

"Data protection is a guarantee of trust. It can even be a competitive advantage," said Specht-Riemenschneider. "What hinders innovation is legal uncertainty in the market. And this also stems from a proliferation of digital legislation."

She said that digital legislation in Europe must be better coordinated, with clear rules including for data protection.

Authorities in South Korea, Italy, Taiwan and Australia have already taken action against DeepSeek.

[...]

 

Archived

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on Tuesday claimed that Russia has already more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.

Mishustin credited the ramped-up manufacturing to greater state financial support for producers and innovators, including civilian companies.

Analysts from the Washington-based think tank, Institute for the Study of War, assessed that increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia’s growing nightly strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine. It has also enabled Russian forces to integrate Shahed-like drones into strikes against frontline Ukrainian positions, ISW reported.

The think tank specified that Russian forces are “continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat operations to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions, and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.”

[...]

Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight said on Tuesday that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.

[...]

One electronic and radio warfare expert cited by ISW, Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on Tuesday that Ukrainian forces had observed a new type of Chinese wi-fi router on radio modems installed on Russian “Gerber” drones.

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38491622

[...]

Many [Ukrainian] children were moved to Russian territories under the guise of vacation, education, or medical care. Some were placed in camps posing as integration programs, others were adopted into Russian families, stripped of their identities, and reissued new documents. In Russian schools, they’re banned from speaking Ukrainian, exposed to propaganda, and often recruited into the Youth Army.

This policy dates back to 2014, after Russia occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but has intensified. Many of the children taken were not orphans, despite Russian claims. Most had living parents or relatives. Some were institutionalized, others were seized after parents were detained or separated.

[...]

Anatolii’s [not his real name] story is one of many such stories that fortunately ended with Save Ukraine being able to bring him back.

At 17, he was taken straight from school by Russian forces. A week before his 18th birthday, Anatolii was handed a conscription notice from the Russian army—with no real choice but to serve [...] Anatolii stayed behind in a southern Ukrainian town after his brother fled.

He became a target after he and his brother found two boxes of ammunition in a forest and threw them away. FSB agents later detained and beat him, demanding the weapons and names of Ukrainian soldiers. One day, they dragged him from the principal’s office, tied him up, put a bag over his head, and took him to be tortured.

“They broke my rib and shoulder joint, smashed my face, gave me lots of bruises… They said: ‘If we find anything on your phone—you won’t live.'”

At school, Anatolii was taught to shoot and handle explosives. Russians offered him trips to military camps, but he kept refusing.

[...]

In Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the Kremlin is waging a long-term campaign to erase Ukrainian identity and reshape the next generation into loyal subjects of the Russian state. Central to this effort is the militarization of children through schools, propaganda, and paramilitary training.

In classrooms, Ukrainian curricula are being replaced with Russian textbooks. The language, culture, and history of Ukraine are banned or distorted. Weekly indoctrination sessions known as “Conversations About the Important” push pro-Kremlin narratives and glorify military service. Children are taught to view Ukraine and the West as enemies.

[...]

Recruitment into these programs doesn’t focus on academic performance or discipline. Instead, students with aggressive behavior, bullying records, or emotional instability are often targeted, pointing to a disturbing strategy to raise a generation predisposed to violence and deeply indoctrinated with hostility toward NATO and the United States.

[...]

In 2016, Russia’s Defense Ministry launched a youth “military-patriotic” organization called Yunarmiya, or in English, Young Army. In reality, it’s a militarized movement that instills the ideology of Russian aggression and grooms future soldiers for the occupying regime.

Children as young as eight are enrolled. They’re made to swear an oath of loyalty to Russia, promise to “defend its interests,” and embrace “great patriotism.” After that, they undergo firearms and tactical training, learn to operate drones, and more.

Ashley Jordana, Hala Systems’ Director of Law, Policy and Human Rights, said Hala’s assessment, based on geolocation data from mobile phones traced to Yunarmiya bases and testimonies from survivors, suggests cadets are roused daily at 6 am. After a canteen breakfast of eggs and oatmeal, they attend classes in firearms assembly, mine clearance, and military tactics.

[...]

In Crimea, occupied since 2014, Russian authorities dismantled Ukrainian education and launched programs like The Train of Hope to assimilate children. The programme is a Russian state-run initiative launched in occupied Crimea that facilitates the adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families. Monuments to Russian weapons designers were erected on school grounds, and a 2014 doctrine officially linked education to military preparation.

[...]

Some of the children indoctrinated after 2014 are now dying on the battlefield, celebrated as heroes in Russian propaganda. One such case is 16-year-old Illia Moskvitin, a Youth Army member from occupied Donetsk, who was killed by a landmine in 2022. Others, like Ivan Shifman and Dmytro Kotov, joined Russian forces after years of ideological grooming.

[...]

  • Dmytro Kotov: In 2015, he graduated from Gymnasium №6 in Dzhankoi, temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia later sent him to Yunarmiya, according to open-source data. After completing his studies at the Sevastopol State Technical University, Kotov signed a contract with the Russian military and served aboard the large landing ship Novocherkassk, part of the 197th Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. Dmytro died on March 24, 2022, while participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

  • Illia Moskvitin was also a member of the Yunarmiya unit operating in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region. Illia died on April 14, 2022, before even reaching the age of 16, after stepping on a Lepestok anti-personnel mine, according to materials published by the Yunarmiya organization.

  • Ivan Shifman, a student at School №1 in the city of Kalmiuske in the Donetsk region, joined Yunarmiya in 2019. After turning 18, he enlisted in the so-called “People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic” and began serving in Russia’s 1st Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ivan took part in combat operations in several towns across the Donetsk region, including Starohnativka, Hranitne, Malyi Yanisol, Zaitseve, and Rozivka. Ivan was killed in action near the village of Novobakhmutivka along the front line in Donetsk on April 14, 2022—the same day as Illia.

[...]

** What needs to be done to prevent it**

The evidence gathered in this article barely touches the surface of this issue, but it shows how Russia’s child abductions are a systemic state policy.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023 for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in the deportations, an act that constitutes a war crime under international law.

Both are suspected of committing the war crime of unlawfully deporting children from occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia—an operation the court says has been underway since at least February 24, 2022.

A historic moment in international law unfolded in Strasbourg on June 25, 2025, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset formally launched the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine, established in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

[...]

 

[...]

Many [Ukrainian] children were moved to Russian territories under the guise of vacation, education, or medical care. Some were placed in camps posing as integration programs, others were adopted into Russian families, stripped of their identities, and reissued new documents. In Russian schools, they’re banned from speaking Ukrainian, exposed to propaganda, and often recruited into the Youth Army.

This policy dates back to 2014, after Russia occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but has intensified. Many of the children taken were not orphans, despite Russian claims. Most had living parents or relatives. Some were institutionalized, others were seized after parents were detained or separated.

[...]

Anatolii’s [not his real name] story is one of many such stories that fortunately ended with Save Ukraine being able to bring him back.

At 17, he was taken straight from school by Russian forces. A week before his 18th birthday, Anatolii was handed a conscription notice from the Russian army—with no real choice but to serve [...] Anatolii stayed behind in a southern Ukrainian town after his brother fled.

He became a target after he and his brother found two boxes of ammunition in a forest and threw them away. FSB agents later detained and beat him, demanding the weapons and names of Ukrainian soldiers. One day, they dragged him from the principal’s office, tied him up, put a bag over his head, and took him to be tortured.

“They broke my rib and shoulder joint, smashed my face, gave me lots of bruises… They said: ‘If we find anything on your phone—you won’t live.'”

At school, Anatolii was taught to shoot and handle explosives. Russians offered him trips to military camps, but he kept refusing.

[...]

In Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the Kremlin is waging a long-term campaign to erase Ukrainian identity and reshape the next generation into loyal subjects of the Russian state. Central to this effort is the militarization of children through schools, propaganda, and paramilitary training.

In classrooms, Ukrainian curricula are being replaced with Russian textbooks. The language, culture, and history of Ukraine are banned or distorted. Weekly indoctrination sessions known as “Conversations About the Important” push pro-Kremlin narratives and glorify military service. Children are taught to view Ukraine and the West as enemies.

[...]

Recruitment into these programs doesn’t focus on academic performance or discipline. Instead, students with aggressive behavior, bullying records, or emotional instability are often targeted, pointing to a disturbing strategy to raise a generation predisposed to violence and deeply indoctrinated with hostility toward NATO and the United States.

[...]

In 2016, Russia’s Defense Ministry launched a youth “military-patriotic” organization called Yunarmiya, or in English, Young Army. In reality, it’s a militarized movement that instills the ideology of Russian aggression and grooms future soldiers for the occupying regime.

Children as young as eight are enrolled. They’re made to swear an oath of loyalty to Russia, promise to “defend its interests,” and embrace “great patriotism.” After that, they undergo firearms and tactical training, learn to operate drones, and more.

Ashley Jordana, Hala Systems’ Director of Law, Policy and Human Rights, said Hala’s assessment, based on geolocation data from mobile phones traced to Yunarmiya bases and testimonies from survivors, suggests cadets are roused daily at 6 am. After a canteen breakfast of eggs and oatmeal, they attend classes in firearms assembly, mine clearance, and military tactics.

[...]

In Crimea, occupied since 2014, Russian authorities dismantled Ukrainian education and launched programs like The Train of Hope to assimilate children. The programme is a Russian state-run initiative launched in occupied Crimea that facilitates the adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families. Monuments to Russian weapons designers were erected on school grounds, and a 2014 doctrine officially linked education to military preparation.

[...]

Some of the children indoctrinated after 2014 are now dying on the battlefield, celebrated as heroes in Russian propaganda. One such case is 16-year-old Illia Moskvitin, a Youth Army member from occupied Donetsk, who was killed by a landmine in 2022. Others, like Ivan Shifman and Dmytro Kotov, joined Russian forces after years of ideological grooming.

[...]

  • Dmytro Kotov: In 2015, he graduated from Gymnasium №6 in Dzhankoi, temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia later sent him to Yunarmiya, according to open-source data. After completing his studies at the Sevastopol State Technical University, Kotov signed a contract with the Russian military and served aboard the large landing ship Novocherkassk, part of the 197th Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. Dmytro died on March 24, 2022, while participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

  • Illia Moskvitin was also a member of the Yunarmiya unit operating in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region. Illia died on April 14, 2022, before even reaching the age of 16, after stepping on a Lepestok anti-personnel mine, according to materials published by the Yunarmiya organization.

  • Ivan Shifman, a student at School №1 in the city of Kalmiuske in the Donetsk region, joined Yunarmiya in 2019. After turning 18, he enlisted in the so-called “People’s Militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic” and began serving in Russia’s 1st Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ivan took part in combat operations in several towns across the Donetsk region, including Starohnativka, Hranitne, Malyi Yanisol, Zaitseve, and Rozivka. Ivan was killed in action near the village of Novobakhmutivka along the front line in Donetsk on April 14, 2022—the same day as Illia.

[...]

** What needs to be done to prevent it**

The evidence gathered in this article barely touches the surface of this issue, but it shows how Russia’s child abductions are a systemic state policy.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023 for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for their roles in the deportations, an act that constitutes a war crime under international law.

Both are suspected of committing the war crime of unlawfully deporting children from occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia—an operation the court says has been underway since at least February 24, 2022.

A historic moment in international law unfolded in Strasbourg on June 25, 2025, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset formally launched the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine, established in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

[...]

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38483748

Archived

Can propagandists be held accountable for war crimes? People sometimes point to cases like Nuremberg or Rwanda, where media figures were prosecuted for inciting atrocities. But those are the outliers. Legal accountability for propagandists remains incredibly rare, and proving they intended their words to lead to war crimes is a steep legal climb.

[...]

Almost every Russian war crime in Ukraine that has captured international attention comes with a pre-planned, carefully planted excuse. A lie, seeded days in advance through a wide network of actors, is designed to shift blame onto Ukraine and mislead journalists, politicians and the general public by sowing doubt.

[...]

As soon as an attack happens, they point back to the story they planted, using it as evidence of Ukraine’s involvement. Its purpose? To obstruct accountability. Those doing it? They know an attack is imminent because they’re preparing the justification in advance.

And it’s precisely this foreknowledge and orchestration that could help build a legal case.

[...]

An example of information alibis is:

When Russians want to bomb a place, for example, Kremenchuk Railway Station, . . . they (will say in advance that) Ukraine was going to do it, and then they do it.

[...]

(Information alibi is a strategy that) consists of proactively accusing the other party of actions that will actually be committed by the accusers themselves.

This forces journalists to report Russian lies alongside reality, confusing, deceiving, and seeding doubt within the information space, while disrupting and delaying thorough investigations into the attack.

“This tactic…represents a cynical weaponisation of rhetoric as part of Russia’s broader military strategy,” the report states.

[...]

A Russian March 22 airstrike devastated Ukraine’s Mariupol’s Maternity Hospital No. 3, killing at least three individuals and injuring at least 17 more. Before the attack, Russia’s information alibi had already flooded the information space.

Kremlin officials and pro-Russian media were falsely accusing Ukrainian forces of using their civilians as human shields in Mariupol and of interrupting civilians’ evacuation efforts starting the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion [...]

[...]

I received threats that they would come and find me, that I would be killed, that my child would be cut into pieces. -- Marianna Vyshemirskaya, a pregnant woman injured in an attack, with blood on her face. Her photo provoked international condemnation. The Russian Embassy in the UK and pro-Kremlin media smeared her as an actress staging the scene.

[...]

Russia treats information warfare as a central tool of state power, mobilising a complex network of Kremlin officials, members of the state security services, private entities and individuals unaffiliated with but tangentially connected to the Russian state, among others, to spread disinformation. Understanding the structure and hierarchy of Russian information operations is key to identifying those responsible for disseminating harmful narratives.

[...]

At the top [of Russia's information warfare progamme] are Vladimir Putin and key advisors like Sergey Kiriyenko, Alexey Gromov and Sofia Zakharova—so-called “curators” of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine. Gromov oversees traditional media; Kiriyenko manages digital operations, with his son Vladimir heading VK, Russia’s largest social platform. Zakharova was sanctioned by the US for her role in the Doppelganger disinfo campaign.

[...]

Russia’s information ecosystem includes TV propagandists, media outlets and administrators of pro-war Telegram channels—some state-linked, others semi-independent. Various Russian Telegram channels like WarGonzo, Operation Z, Smotri, Khersonskiy Vestnik, and Kremlevskaya prachka played key roles in disseminating false information about Ukraine. Outlets like Readovka, Pul №3, ANNA-NEWS, and War on Fakes consistently echoed Kremlin messaging with lies and conspiracy theories.

[...]

 

Archived

Can propagandists be held accountable for war crimes? People sometimes point to cases like Nuremberg or Rwanda, where media figures were prosecuted for inciting atrocities. But those are the outliers. Legal accountability for propagandists remains incredibly rare, and proving they intended their words to lead to war crimes is a steep legal climb.

[...]

Almost every Russian war crime in Ukraine that has captured international attention comes with a pre-planned, carefully planted excuse. A lie, seeded days in advance through a wide network of actors, is designed to shift blame onto Ukraine and mislead journalists, politicians and the general public by sowing doubt.

[...]

As soon as an attack happens, they point back to the story they planted, using it as evidence of Ukraine’s involvement. Its purpose? To obstruct accountability. Those doing it? They know an attack is imminent because they’re preparing the justification in advance.

And it’s precisely this foreknowledge and orchestration that could help build a legal case.

[...]

An example of information alibis is:

When Russians want to bomb a place, for example, Kremenchuk Railway Station, . . . they (will say in advance that) Ukraine was going to do it, and then they do it.

[...]

(Information alibi is a strategy that) consists of proactively accusing the other party of actions that will actually be committed by the accusers themselves.

This forces journalists to report Russian lies alongside reality, confusing, deceiving, and seeding doubt within the information space, while disrupting and delaying thorough investigations into the attack.

“This tactic…represents a cynical weaponisation of rhetoric as part of Russia’s broader military strategy,” the report states.

[...]

A Russian March 22 airstrike devastated Ukraine’s Mariupol’s Maternity Hospital No. 3, killing at least three individuals and injuring at least 17 more. Before the attack, Russia’s information alibi had already flooded the information space.

Kremlin officials and pro-Russian media were falsely accusing Ukrainian forces of using their civilians as human shields in Mariupol and of interrupting civilians’ evacuation efforts starting the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion [...]

[...]

I received threats that they would come and find me, that I would be killed, that my child would be cut into pieces. -- Marianna Vyshemirskaya, a pregnant woman injured in an attack, with blood on her face. Her photo provoked international condemnation. The Russian Embassy in the UK and pro-Kremlin media smeared her as an actress staging the scene.

[...]

Russia treats information warfare as a central tool of state power, mobilising a complex network of Kremlin officials, members of the state security services, private entities and individuals unaffiliated with but tangentially connected to the Russian state, among others, to spread disinformation. Understanding the structure and hierarchy of Russian information operations is key to identifying those responsible for disseminating harmful narratives.

[...]

At the top [of Russia's information warfare progamme] are Vladimir Putin and key advisors like Sergey Kiriyenko, Alexey Gromov and Sofia Zakharova—so-called “curators” of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine. Gromov oversees traditional media; Kiriyenko manages digital operations, with his son Vladimir heading VK, Russia’s largest social platform. Zakharova was sanctioned by the US for her role in the Doppelganger disinfo campaign.

[...]

Russia’s information ecosystem includes TV propagandists, media outlets and administrators of pro-war Telegram channels—some state-linked, others semi-independent. Various Russian Telegram channels like WarGonzo, Operation Z, Smotri, Khersonskiy Vestnik, and Kremlevskaya prachka played key roles in disseminating false information about Ukraine. Outlets like Readovka, Pul №3, ANNA-NEWS, and War on Fakes consistently echoed Kremlin messaging with lies and conspiracy theories.

[...]

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38481725

Archived

Describing the campaign to subjugate Ukraine as a “personal obsession” for Putin, [Ukraine’s former defence minister] Oleksii Reznikov said the conflict would continue in some form or another as long as he remained in the Kremlin.

Even if a ceasefire were declared and buffer zones established, Russia would continue to fight a hybrid war as it did in the years leading up to the full-scale invasion of 2022.

Members of Putin’s inner circle who may succeed him are unlikely to choose to continue the conflict, he said, because of the debilitating effect that sanctions have had on the country’s economy.

“[Putin] is afraid of Ukraine, because we are a threat to his regime,” Reznikov, who served as defence minister from the start of the invasion until September 2023, said in an interview with The Times. “If the Russian population sees that the democratic, liberal, European way is better than tyranny, then for the regime it becomes a question of survival."

[...]

Andriy Zagorodnyuk, who served as defence minister between 2019 and 2020, said that Ukraine should look to make itself into a “steel porcupine” capable of withstanding Russian aggression for years to come.

“Rather than assuming the war can be ended through a comprehensive battlefield victory or a negotiated compromise, Ukraine and its allies must plan to build a viable, sovereign and secure state under constant military pressure,” he wrote in an article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank.

[...]

The rate of advancement [of Russia on the battlefield], remains glacially slow, with Russia having captured less than 1 per cent of Ukrainian land since the fall of Avdiivka in February 2024.

[...]

Asked what he believes Putin’s military objectives are, Reznikov invoked a scene from Yes, Prime Minister, the British television comedy of the 1980s, in which an adviser explains the Soviets’ use of “salami tactics”. The strategy involves a series of small gains, akin to thinly slicing a salami, that ultimately results in a significant advance.

Reznikov said this was an accurate description of Russian tactics to this day. “They started with Crimea — slices of salami. Then Luhansk — slices of salami. Then Donetsk — slices of salami. Today they occupy part of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. They will advance as long as you allow them to advance, taking as much land as they can.”

[...]

In June Russia surpassed the milestone of one million soldiers killed or wounded in action. But the state is enlisting an estimated 30,000 recruits a month, enticed by a generous salary and signing-on fee, so there is little prospect of any abatement to the rate of attrition.

“They have a huge manpower resources because the country has a population of 130 million,” said Reznikov. “So, for them it’s nothing to use these soldiers as cannon fodder. They place no value on human life.”

[...]

 

Archived

Describing the campaign to subjugate Ukraine as a “personal obsession” for Putin, [Ukraine’s former defence minister] Oleksii Reznikov said the conflict would continue in some form or another as long as he remained in the Kremlin.

Even if a ceasefire were declared and buffer zones established, Russia would continue to fight a hybrid war as it did in the years leading up to the full-scale invasion of 2022.

Members of Putin’s inner circle who may succeed him are unlikely to choose to continue the conflict, he said, because of the debilitating effect that sanctions have had on the country’s economy.

“[Putin] is afraid of Ukraine, because we are a threat to his regime,” Reznikov, who served as defence minister from the start of the invasion until September 2023, said in an interview with The Times. “If the Russian population sees that the democratic, liberal, European way is better than tyranny, then for the regime it becomes a question of survival."

[...]

Andriy Zagorodnyuk, who served as defence minister between 2019 and 2020, said that Ukraine should look to make itself into a “steel porcupine” capable of withstanding Russian aggression for years to come.

“Rather than assuming the war can be ended through a comprehensive battlefield victory or a negotiated compromise, Ukraine and its allies must plan to build a viable, sovereign and secure state under constant military pressure,” he wrote in an article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank.

[...]

The rate of advancement [of Russia on the battlefield], remains glacially slow, with Russia having captured less than 1 per cent of Ukrainian land since the fall of Avdiivka in February 2024.

[...]

Asked what he believes Putin’s military objectives are, Reznikov invoked a scene from Yes, Prime Minister, the British television comedy of the 1980s, in which an adviser explains the Soviets’ use of “salami tactics”. The strategy involves a series of small gains, akin to thinly slicing a salami, that ultimately results in a significant advance.

Reznikov said this was an accurate description of Russian tactics to this day. “They started with Crimea — slices of salami. Then Luhansk — slices of salami. Then Donetsk — slices of salami. Today they occupy part of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. They will advance as long as you allow them to advance, taking as much land as they can.”

[...]

In June Russia surpassed the milestone of one million soldiers killed or wounded in action. But the state is enlisting an estimated 30,000 recruits a month, enticed by a generous salary and signing-on fee, so there is little prospect of any abatement to the rate of attrition.

“They have a huge manpower resources because the country has a population of 130 million,” said Reznikov. “So, for them it’s nothing to use these soldiers as cannon fodder. They place no value on human life.”

[...]

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 4 points 1 day ago (1 children)

Question is how much of it is genuine and how much of it is exacerbated

A few weeks ago, an audio gathered by civil guard investigators (which do now rely on Huawei?) was made public and appeared to show the PSOE secretary, Santos Cerdán - a a trusted confidant of prime minister Sanchez - , discussing commissions paid by companies in exchange for public contracts.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 8 points 3 days ago

Maybe some people would be willing to work 996 for a certain amount of time, if and when they get their equal share of the proceeds then ...

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 2 points 4 days ago (1 children)

Lol and what about them other AIs

Whataboutism, the rhetorical practice of responding to an accusation or difficult question by making a counteraccusation, by asking a different but related question, or by raising a different issue altogether. Whataboutism often serves to reduce the perceived plausibility or seriousness of the original accusation or question by suggesting that the person advancing it is hypocritical or that the responder’s misbehavior is not unique or unprecedented. Acts of whataboutism typically begin with rhetorical questions of the form “What about…?”

Source

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 9 points 5 days ago

The "tankie.tube" is a channel for authoritarian propaganda.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 4 points 1 week ago

Brazil sues China carmaker BYD over 'slave-like' conditions

Brazilian prosecutors are suing Chinese electric vehicle (EV) giant BYD and two of its contractors, saying they were responsible for human trafficking and conditions "analogous to slavery" at a factory construction site in the country.

Did coerced labour build your car?

Thousands of cars ship out of factories every day. But at the other end of the production line, workers are shipped in – thousands of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz every year – from Xinjiang, the western region at the centre of a long-running human rights crisis.

Moved as part of a labour transfer scheme that experts call forced labour, these ethnic minorities are coercively recruited by the Chinese state to travel thousands of miles and fill the manufacturing jobs that recent Chinese graduates have spurned. An investigation by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism has found more than 100 brands whose products have been made, in part or whole, by workers moved under this system.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 1 week ago

Brazil sues China carmaker BYD over 'slave-like' conditions

Brazilian prosecutors are suing Chinese electric vehicle (EV) giant BYD and two of its contractors, saying they were responsible for human trafficking and conditions "analogous to slavery" at a factory construction site in the country.

Did coerced labour build your car?

Thousands of cars ship out of factories every day. But at the other end of the production line, workers are shipped in – thousands of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz every year – from Xinjiang, the western region at the centre of a long-running human rights crisis.

Moved as part of a labour transfer scheme that experts call forced labour, these ethnic minorities are coercively recruited by the Chinese state to travel thousands of miles and fill the manufacturing jobs that recent Chinese graduates have spurned. An investigation by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism has found more than 100 brands whose products have been made, in part or whole, by workers moved under this system.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 7 points 1 week ago (1 children)

Defence or Welfare? Europe Can Afford Both, and Must

This is a highly biased article with little content. The article links to a couple of other media reports, but the author admits that increased military spending will "likely" result in a further erosion of the decades-old European social compact. I very much doubt that the author has had a look into the budget plan of a single EU member. They mention not a single number in the whole article, no research, it's just a rant with a bold headline that serves a particular narrative.

What makes the whole thing worse is the sentence:

Europe’s leaders have decided to embrace the sort of massive ramp-up in military spending that so often serves as the prelude to war.

No, the current 'ramp-up' of military spending is certainly not 'the prelude of war' - simply because the war is already here. It has been happening for more than three years with military attacks on Ukraine and what is sometimes called a 'hybrid war' against European countries such as a recent arson attack on a restaurant in Estonia ordered by Russian intelligence .

I don't see what's wrong if the European countries spend "3.5 percent of their respective GDPs on core military spending, and another 1.5 percent on security and miscellaneous other expenditures designed to harden economies and infrastructure against cyberattacks, people trafficking, and additional risks and perceived risks to NATO economies."

Estonia, for example, has been spending more than 5% of its GDP for defense already before the Nato summit, and I argue that this has not so much to do with 'appeasing' Trump than with its common border with Russia.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 2 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago)

Unfortunately there is only a German version of the study, I don't know whether you speak German or you may manage to get a automated translation.

Study: Junges Europe 2025 / Young Europe 2025 - (PDF)

In the study (85 pages) you see each question and the response.

Last year the study was also available in English (Young Europe 2024 - pdf)

I hope this helps somehow.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 3 points 1 week ago (1 children)
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 63 points 1 week ago (3 children)

This is a very weird framing of this study. The original study (which is linked in the article) is in German. Those who don't speak German will find a useful translation provider, I provide the study's summary literal translation:

>Young people: EU and democracy are good, but reforms are needed

  • 57% prefer democracy to any other form of government - 39% think that the EU does not function particularly democratically
  • Young Europeans want change - 53% criticize the EU for being too preoccupied with trivialities instead of focusing on the essentials
  • Cost of living, defense against external threats and better conditions for businesses should be priorities for the EU
  • Only 42% think that the EU is one of the three most powerful global political players

Among others, the study also says (again, a direct translation, I am not paraphrasing):

48% of young Europeans believe that democracy in their country is under threat, compared to 61% in Germany. Two thirds rate their country's membership of the EU as positive. At the same time, 53% of young people criticize the fact that the EU is too often concerned with minor issues. Half of 16 to 26-year-olds think the EU is a good idea, but very poorly implemented.

I don't say that everything is perfect, but the whole study paints a completely different picture than this article - and especially its headline - appears to suggest.

[Edit my comments for clarity, translation has not been edited.]

view more: next ›