Can propagandists be held accountable for war crimes? People sometimes point to cases like Nuremberg or Rwanda, where media figures were prosecuted for inciting atrocities. But those are the outliers. Legal accountability for propagandists remains incredibly rare, and proving they intended their words to lead to war crimes is a steep legal climb.
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Almost every Russian war crime in Ukraine that has captured international attention comes with a pre-planned, carefully planted excuse. A lie, seeded days in advance through a wide network of actors, is designed to shift blame onto Ukraine and mislead journalists, politicians and the general public by sowing doubt.
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As soon as an attack happens, they point back to the story they planted, using it as evidence of Ukraine’s involvement. Its purpose? To obstruct accountability. Those doing it? They know an attack is imminent because they’re preparing the justification in advance.
And it’s precisely this foreknowledge and orchestration that could help build a legal case.
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An example of information alibis is:
When Russians want to bomb a place, for example, Kremenchuk Railway Station, . . . they (will say in advance that) Ukraine was going to do it, and then they do it.
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(Information alibi is a strategy that) consists of proactively accusing the other party of actions that will actually be committed by the accusers themselves.
This forces journalists to report Russian lies alongside reality, confusing, deceiving, and seeding doubt within the information space, while disrupting and delaying thorough investigations into the attack.
“This tactic…represents a cynical weaponisation of rhetoric as part of Russia’s broader military strategy,” the report states.
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A Russian March 22 airstrike devastated Ukraine’s Mariupol’s Maternity Hospital No. 3, killing at least three individuals and injuring at least 17 more. Before the attack, Russia’s information alibi had already flooded the information space.
Kremlin officials and pro-Russian media were falsely accusing Ukrainian forces of using their civilians as human shields in Mariupol and of interrupting civilians’ evacuation efforts starting the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion [...]
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I received threats that they would come and find me, that I would be killed, that my child would be cut into pieces. -- Marianna Vyshemirskaya, a pregnant woman injured in an attack, with blood on her face. Her photo provoked international condemnation. The Russian Embassy in the UK and pro-Kremlin media smeared her as an actress staging the scene.
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Russia treats information warfare as a central tool of state power, mobilising a complex network of Kremlin officials, members of the state security services, private entities and individuals unaffiliated with but tangentially connected to the Russian state, among others, to spread disinformation. Understanding the structure and hierarchy of Russian information operations is key to identifying those responsible for disseminating harmful narratives.
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At the top [of Russia's information warfare progamme] are Vladimir Putin and key advisors like Sergey Kiriyenko, Alexey Gromov and Sofia Zakharova—so-called “curators” of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine. Gromov oversees traditional media; Kiriyenko manages digital operations, with his son Vladimir heading VK, Russia’s largest social platform. Zakharova was sanctioned by the US for her role in the Doppelganger disinfo campaign.
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Russia’s information ecosystem includes TV propagandists, media outlets and administrators of pro-war Telegram channels—some state-linked, others semi-independent. Various Russian Telegram channels like WarGonzo, Operation Z, Smotri, Khersonskiy Vestnik, and Kremlevskaya prachka played key roles in disseminating false information about Ukraine. Outlets like Readovka, Pul №3, ANNA-NEWS, and War on Fakes consistently echoed Kremlin messaging with lies and conspiracy theories.
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