Transcript
A post by [object Object] (@zzt@mas.to) saying:
courtesy of @davidgerard@circumstances.run, Proton is now the only privacy vendor I know of that vibe codes its apps:
In the single most damning thing I can say about Proton in 2025, the Proton GitHub repository has a “cursorrules” file. They’re vibe-coding their public systems. Much secure!
I am once again begging anyone who will listen to get off of Proton as soon as reasonably possible, and to avoid their new (terrible) apps in any case. https://circumstances.run/@davidgerard/114961415946154957
It has a reply by the author saying: in an unsurprising update for those familiar with how Proton operates, they silently rewrote their monorepo’s history to purge .cursor and hide that they were vibe coding: https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients/tree/2a5e2ad4db0c84f39050bf2353c944a96d38e07f
given the utter lack of communication from Proton on this, I can only guess they’ve extracted .cursor into an external repository and continue to use it out of sight of the public
You seem to be misinformed. Signals architecture is explicitly designed in a way to minimise metadata as much as possible. You can look up the data they had to hand over due to lawsuits, it was absolutely minimal
First - I'm not sure Sealed Sender would help against the server being changed to be actively malicious and trying to build social graphs. Second - even metadata concerns aside, a centralized system is just not resilient. Proposals like Chat Control are A LOT more easily enforceable with them than with tiny selfhosted servers.
I know that Signal runs on US cloud infrastructure (like AWS IRRC)
Doesn't change a thing about it's security or what they hand to disclose to authorities
And only that one.
Signal dev is quite adamant on not letting people have their own servers, select a EU provider (yeah, EU is nazifying, but at least it's a large enough second-hand basket) or host the (suppossedly zero-knowledge) messages on one's own infrastructure. I'd say that's curious.